Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.: Statutory Interpretation or Nonstatutory Choice of Laws - What Is the Proper Juristic Standard When International Political Objectives and Federal Law Intersect by Lamb, Lewis E., III
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 17 | Number 2 Article 5
Spring 1992
Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.: Statutory
Interpretation or Nonstatutory Choice of Laws -
What Is the Proper Juristic Standard When
International Political Objectives and Federal Law
Intersect
Lewis E. Lamb III
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lewis E. Lamb III, Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.: Statutory Interpretation or Nonstatutory Choice of Laws - What Is the Proper Juristic
Standard When International Political Objectives and Federal Law Intersect, 17 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 339 (1992).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol17/iss2/5
Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.: Statutory Interpretation or
Nonstatutory Choice of Laws - What Is the Proper Juristic Standard
When International Political Objectives and Federal Law Intersect
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This note is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol17/iss2/5
Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.: Statutory
Interpretation or Nonstatutory Choice of Laws -
What Is the Proper Juristic Standard When
International Political Objectives and
Federal Law Intersect?
I. Introduction
On April 29, 1991, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
handed down a divided decision holding that the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor and Standards Act (FLSA) t did not ap-
ply to Filipino sailors employed aboard foreign-owned tankers tem-
porarily reflagged under the United States ensign and operating
outside of United States waters. While one member of the three
judge panel concurred in the judgment only2 and one member dis-
sented,3 the holding of the court in Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. 4
may further confine the already restrictive standard governing the
extraterritorial application of federal law by refusing to classify a
United States flagged vessel as necessarily within the ambit of federal
labor legislation by virtue of the flag it flies. 5 Broadly, Cruz repre-
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). The relevant portions of the Act state:
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any work
week is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
or is employed by an enterprise engaged in'commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce ....
(1) not less than [the minimum wage] ....
(4) If such employee is employed as a seaman on an American vessel,
not less than the rate which will provide to the employee, for the period cov-
ered by the wage payment, wages equal to compensation at the hourly rate
prescribed by paragraph (1) of this subsection for all hours during such pe-
riod when he was actually on duty ....
29 U.S.C. § 206 (a), (a)(l), (a)(4) (1988).
2 Judges Rosenn and Cowen concurred in the judgment, but wrote separate opin-
ions as to the proper method of addressing the legal issues presented. Judge Rosenn
analyzed the issue under statutory interpretation standards. Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping,
Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 219 (3d Cir. 1991). Judge Cowen addressed the issue under a choice
of laws approach. Id. at 233 (Cowen, J., concurring).
3 Judge Alito dissented from the judgment analyzing the facts under both choice of
law principles and statutory interpretation. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 235 (Alito, J., dissenting).
4 932 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991).
5 The issue of whether application of federal law to a U.S. flagged vessel constitutes
extraterritorial application is discussed infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text. While
it is arguable that such a vessel is United States territory, Judge Rosenn dismissed such
reasoning and Judge Cowen did not address the issue at all. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 227-28.
Judge Alito, dissenting from the court's holding, advocated the stance that a United States
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sents a further limitation in the area of extraterritorial application of
federal law.6 More specifically, Cruz erodes the general maritime
principles which regard the law of the flag as paramount in matters
of jurisdiction over oceangoing vessels7 and consider seamen as
"wards of admiralty" entitled to particular protection.8
Beyond the trend represented by, or the legal effect stemming
from, such a holding, the dicta of Cruz functions to highlight compel-
ling questions relating to judicial methodology appropriate to the
adjudication of admiralty issues which intersect international rela-
tions and domestic regulation. In addition to addressing the specific
issue brought to bar by the plaintiffs, Cruz concurrently raises a criti-
cal issue concerning the proper method of construing federal legisla-
tion regarding extraterritorial application. The division evident
within the opinions of the panel members pointedly poses the ques-
tion of whether statutory interpretation or a non-statutory choice of
laws standard should be applied in such circumstances.
After reviewing the facts and the holdings of the courts in Cruz,
this Note evaluates the questions of judicial methodology presented
by the dicta in the circuit court's analysis and examines aspects of the
court's reasoning under these methods. Against the backdrop of ad-
miralty law, the Note posits that: 1) the plaintiffs' claim was properly
evaluated under statutory interpretation standards; and 2) a choice
of laws analysis is inappropriate in any maritime application of the
FLSA. This Note concludes that though the court of appeals prop-
erly scrutinized the plaintiffs' claim under statutory interpretation
standards, it erroneously held that the plaintiffs fell outside coverage
of the FLSA.9 This Note finally suggests that the confusion manifest
over the proper standard to be applied, and perhaps even the hold-
ing itself, demonstrate that a Supreme Court pronouncement on the
flagged vessel was part of United States territory and not a foreign workplace within the
meaning of the FLSA. Id. at 238.
6 The Court has declined to apply federal legislation abroad in a number of cases.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, I l I S.Ct. 1227 (1991) (holding that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not applicable to United States citizens employed abroad by
U.S. employers).
7 E.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953) (observing that "[plerhaps the
most venerable and universal rule of maritime law relevant to our problem is that which
gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag").
8 See, e.g., Harden v. Gordon, F. Cas. I1, No. 6047 (C.C. Me. 1823) ("Seamen... are
unprotected and need counsel ... and as they have little of the foresight and caution
belonging to persons trained in other pursuits of life, the most rigid scrutiny is instituted
into the terms of every contract in which they engage.").
9 Not only would a finding for the plaintiffs seem to comport with the language of
the statute and the legislative history of the Act, it would also seem just in a broader sense.
In light of the political and economic interests of the United States which were served by
the reflagging and the federal requirements to which the Kuwaiti ship owners were re-
quired to adhere contingent to that reflagging, it seems a nominal concession to require
the vessel owners to pay minimum wages to the Filipino sailors.
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necessary standard is needed.' 0
II. The Facts and Holding of Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.
A. Background
The case under scrutiny arose out of incidents stemming from
the Iran-Iraq war which began in 1980 and spanned most of the dec-
ade."I As hostilities between the two countries increased in the mid-
1980s, Iranian attempts to interrupt the export of Iraqi petroleum
threatened to disrupt neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf.12 Kuwaiti
tankers, in particular, were targeted for attack by Iran because Ku-
wait provided Iraq with financial assistance and the use of its ports.' 3
In order to be secure from the threat to its neutral shipping, Kuwait
approached the United States for assistance.' 4
B. Reflagging of the Kuwaiti Tankers
Kuwait's overture eventually resulted in the reflagging of eleven
Kuwaiti-owned vessels under the United States ensign, thereby af-
fording the vessels protection of United States naval warships.' 5
10 Alternately, or perhaps additionally, Congress should amend title 29 to speak to
the issue of whether a United States flagged vessel is United States territory for legislative
purposes.
I I Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping Inc., 738 F. Supp. 809, 810 (D.Del. 1990), aft'd, 932
F.2d 218 (1991) (citing Kuwaiti Tankers: Hearings Before the House of Representatives Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1987) (hereinafter Kuwaiti
Tanker Hearings); See also MatthewJ. Ferretti, Comment, The Iran-Iraq War: United States Reso-
lution of an Armed Conflict, 35 VILL. L. REv. 197, 197-204 (1990).
12 By 1982, Iran had closed down all Iraqi seaports, forcing Iraq to develop overland
routes in order to export its oil. Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 811 (citing Kuwaiti Tankers Hearings,
supra note 11, at 161-62). Thereafter, Iran began to attack the vessels of non-belligerent
countries which supported Iraq. Id. (citing Kuwaiti Tanker Hearings, supra note 11, at 38,
163).
13 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220 (citing Kuwaiti Tanker Hearings, supra note 11, at 40).
14 Id. Kuwait approached the United States for assistance in 1986. Id. Kuwait had
originally solicited aid from the Soviet Union in a bid to reflag its vessels under the flag of
a foreign government or to charter ships flagged by a foreign government. Cruz, 738 F.
Supp. at 811 (citing Kuwaiti Tanker Hearings, supra note 11, at 37-38, 54). The Soviet Union
had agreed to either such arrangement, but the United States government, anxious to
avoid Soviet involvement in the region, convinced the Kuwaitis to reflag all eleven Kuwaiti
tankers under the United States ensign. Id. (citing Kuwaiti Tanker Hearings, supra note 11, at
38-39, 43).
15 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220. The vessels were reflagged in 1987. Id. For discussion of
details of the reflagging, See Julie Mertus, Note, The Nationality of Ships and International
Responsibility: The Reflagging of The Kuwaiti Tankers , 17 DENV.]. INT'L L. & POL'Y 207, 208-11
(1988). For a discussion of reflagging relating to international law, see Margaret G.
Wachenfeld, Note, Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A U.S. Response in the Persian Gulf, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 174, 183 (1988). In addition to the United States, Britain, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, and Belgium all sent warships and military aircraft to the Persian Gulf during the
Iran-Iraq war. George D. Haimbaugh, Impact of the Reagan Administration on the Law of the
Sea, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151, 159 (1989) (citing R.J. GRUNAWALT, 9 NAVAL WAR PUBLI-
CATIONS (NWP) 3-9 (1988); Policy Statement of Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci,
April 29, 1988). These countries acted under article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
maintaining the individual and collective right to self-defense; under UNCLOS part Ill,
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Contingent to the reflagging, the Kuwaiti government was required
to comply with United States federal law relating to United States
ownership of American flagged vessels,' 6 safety regulations, 17 and
manning requirements.'" In order to expedite the reflagging pro-
cess, however, waivers were made with regard to certain conditions
of the safety regulations' 9 and manning requirements. 20 Following
the reflagging, the eleven vessels operated with a United States naval
escort along their former shipping routes, and carried petroleum
from ports in the Persian Gulf, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the
Far East. 2 '
the right to transit passage through international straights and; under the obligation of the
Hague Convention VIII of 1907, to notify the international community of sea mines in the
Gulf waters. Id.
16 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220. In order to comport with title 46, requiring American own-
ership of United States flagged vessels, Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. was chartered on May
15, 1987, under the laws of Delaware. Id. Title 46 provides for corporate ownership of an
American flagged vessels by:
a corporation established under the laws of the United States or of a State,
whose president or other chief executive officer and chairman of its board of
directors are citizens of the United States and no more of its directors are
noncitizens than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a
quorum...
46 U.S.C. § 12102(a)(4) (1988).
17 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220. The reflagged vessels were obliged to meet safety require-
ments dictated by U.S. maritime law. Id. To insure the general seaworthiness of the ves-
sels and to evaluate factors ranging from sufficiency of accommodations to adequacy of
life-saving and fire fighting equipment, the United States Coast Guard performed an over-
seas safety inspection on the tankers. Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 811-12 (citing Kuwaiti Tanker
Hearings, supra note 11, at 77).
18 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220. Title 46 charges certain citizenship requirements for crews
serving aboard U.S. flag vessels. For example, 46 U.S.C. § 8103(a) dictates that "[o]nly a
citizen of the United States may serve as a master, chief engineer, radio officer or officer in
charge of a deck watch or engineering watch on a documented vessel." 46 U.S.C.
§ 8103(a) (1988).
19 United States Coast Guard inspection indicated that the vessels comported with
international standards, but did not meet more stringent United States standards. Cruz,
738 F. Supp. at 812 (citing Kuwaiti Tanker Hearings, supra note 11, at 78). In order to facili-
tate reflagging, however, a waiver of inspection requirements was granted for a period of
one year and a waiver of drydocking requirements was granted for a period of two years.
Id. (citing Kuwaiti Tanker Hearings, supra note 11, at 41, 78, 146-48).
20 During the initial stages of reflagging, title 46 permitted "the use of non-United
States citizen crew members while each vessel is engaged on a foreign voyage and does not
call at a United States port". Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 8103(b)). Con-
gressional concern over this "foreign to foreign" exemption, however, resulted in the
drafting of amendment section 8103(b)(1), requiring that every unlicensed seaman be a
United States citizen or a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien with a twenty-five
percent cap of the total number of aliens. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 221 n.2 (citing Commercial
Fishing Industry Vessel Anti-Reflagging Act of 1987, Pub.L. 100-239, 101 Stat. 1778 (1988); 46
U.S.C. § 8103(b)(1)). Two days prior to the date the amendment was to become effective,
the Secretary of Defense requested Coast Guard waiver of the revised manning require-
ment with regard to the eleven Kuwaiti tankers. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 221. The Coast Guard
granted the waiver, thus allowing the vessels to retain in their employ the Filipino sailors
previously hired. Id.
21 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 223. Because the safety and manning requirement waivers would
theoretically have given the Kuwaiti vessels operating costs lower than other United States
flagged vessels transporting petroleum, the United States government secured from Ku-
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C. The Plaintiff's Action
The suit was eventually joined by 228 Filipino seamen who
served aboard the eleven reflagged tankers. 22 The plaintiffs sought
recovery of minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act,2 3
claiming that the reflagging under the United States flag brought
them within coverage of the Act. 24 Named as defendants were Ches-
apeake Shipping, Inc., the corporation chartered contingent to the
reflagging, and several related Kuwaiti corporations.2 5
D. The Holding of the District Court
The United States District Court for Delaware granted summary
judgment for the defendants. 2 6 The court observed that as a mari-
time action, the case at bar presented a choice of laws question which
was properly evaluated under the Lauritzen27 -Romero2 8 -Rhoditis29
wait the concession that the tankers would not enter any U.S. port so as to avoid an "ad-
verse impact on the marketplace." Cruz, 738 F. Supp at 812 (citing Kuwaiti Tanker Hearings,
supra note 11, at 83, 87-88).'
22 Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 814. The suit was originally brought as a class action by
eighteen Filipino seamen. Id. Two hundred and ten Filipino seamen later "opted-in" to
the class. Id.23 See supra note 1.
24 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220.
25 Also named in the suit were Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, Kuwait Oil Tanker
Company, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (U.S. Holdings), Santa Fe International Corpo-
ration, and Gleneagle Ship Management Co., an independent contractor. The relation-
ship of the corporate entities was charted by the court as follows:
KUWAIT PETROLEUM CORPORATION (KPC)
[Kuwaiti Corporation Wholly Owned By Kuwaiti Government]
KUWAIT OIL TANKER CO. (KOTC)
[Kuwaiti Corporation Wholly Owned by KPC]
KUWAIT PETROLEUM CORP. (U.S. HOLDINGS) (KPC)
[Wholly Owned by KPC]
CHESAPEAKE SHIPPING, INC.
[Wholly Owned U.S. Subsidiary of KOTC]
SANTA FE INTERNATIONAL CORP.
[U.S. Corporation Wholly Owned By KPC (U.S. Holdings)]
GLENEAGLE SHIP MANAGEMENT CO.
[Wholly Independent U.S. Corporation]
Id. at 232-33.
26 Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 825.
27 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (denying application of the Jones Act to
Danish seaman who signed aboard Danish ship in United States and was subsequently
injured while the vessel was in a Cuban harbor).
. 28 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (denying
application of the Jones Act to Spanish seaman injured aboard Spanish vessel while in
United States port).
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triad of cases.30 Considering the triad's factors - the place of the
wrongful act, the law of the flag, the allegiance or domicile of the
injured party, the allegiance of the defendant shipowner, the place of
contract, the accessibility of a foreign forum, the law of the forum,
and the shipowner's base of operations - the District Court con-
cluded that only the law of the flag and the law of the forum favored
application of United States law.3 ' Accordingly, the court held that
United States law did not apply to the plaintiffs.3 2 Alternatively, the
court held that the plaintiffs were neither engaged "in commerce,"
nor "employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce" as required
under the FLSA, since neither the plaintiffs nor the reflagged vessels
had entered the United States or evidenced any continued links with
United States commerce.3 3 Further, the court declined to regard the
vessels as United States territory, referring to the concept as "a mere
legal fiction and a metaphor" and noting that even if so viewed, the
vessels nevertheless came under the foreign territories exemption
clause3 4 of the FLSA.3 5
29 Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970) (upholding application of
Jones Act to Greek seaman injured aboard Greek vessel while in United States territorial
waters).
30 Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 817. The court observed that "[a]lthough Plaintiffs resist the
application of the Lauritzen-Rhoditis test, it is applicable to all maritime actions." Id.
S Id. Applying this standard the court reasoned:
In this case the place of the wrongful act is either the Philippines, where the
employment contract was entered into, or in Kuwait, Europe and Japan,
where the seamen were paid. Either determination indicates the inapplicabil-
ity of American law. The law of the flag favors applying the law of the United
States, as does the law of the forum. The allegiance of the seamen is to the
Philippines. Construed most favorably to the Plaintiffs, the allegiance of the
shipowner is divided between the United States and Kuwait. The seamen,
pursuant to their employment contracts, have access to a forum in the Philip-
pines. Finally, the base of operations of the shipowner is in Kuwait.
Id.
32 Id.
33 Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 818-22. Referring to the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 203(b)
(1988) that the trade be between a state and a place outside thereof, the court considered
that the plaintiffs themselves were not in commerce because no member of the class had
been to the United States nor had the tankers entered a United States port. Id. at 819.
With respect to the argument that the various corporations related to the reflagged vessels
were an enterprise engaged in commerce, the court noted that these corporations exhib-
ited no "routine links to commerce." d. at 821.
34 Title 29 provides, in pertinent part:
The provisions of sections 206, 207, 211 and 212 of this title shall not apply
with respect to any employee whose services during the workweek are per-
formed in a workplace within a foreign country or within a territory under
the jurisdiction of the United States other than the following: a State of the
United States, the District of Columbia; Puerto Rico; the Virgin Islands;
outer Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462) [43 U.S.C. 1331 el seq.]; American Samoa; Guam;
Wake Island; Eniwetok Atoll; Kwajalein Atoll; and Johnston Island.
29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1988).
35 Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 819, 822-23.
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E. The Holding of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court. 36 Each member of the panel, however, wrote a separate opin-
ion and one member dissented from the judgment. Upholding the
district court,Judges Rosenn and Cowen concurred in judgment, but
differed as to the proper method of addressing the legal issues
presented. Writing for the court, Judge Rosenn purported to apply
strict statutory interpretation standards, eschewing any application
of choice of laws principles. 37 Concurring in the holding only, Judge
Cowen advocated that the issue be addressed exclusively by applica-
tion of choice of laws principles.3 8 Dissenting from the judgment,
Judge Alito examined the Act's legislative history, and found that
strict statutory interpretation or choice of laws principles standing
alone were inadequate to resolve the issue.39
III. The Opinions of the Circuit Court Panel
A. Judge Rosenn - The Statutory Interpretation Approach
1. Rejecting a Choice of Laws Approach
In delivering the opinion of the court, Judge Rosenn rejected an
analysis of the case under choice of laws principles. 40 He noted that
the choice of laws standard elucidated by the Supreme Court4' was
an appropriate principle guiding application of the Jones Act 42 due
to the potentially all-encompassing language of the statute.43 He as-
serted, however, that such a standard was not applicable to cases in-
volving the extraterritorial application of the FLSA since Congress
36 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 220.
37 Id. at 219.
38 Id. at 233 (Cowen, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 235 (Alito,J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 223-25.
41 See supra notes 27-29. See also infra note 58.
42 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). The Jones Act provides that:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to
railway employees shall apply ....
Id.
43 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 224. In Lauritzen, the Court noted that the Jones Act, if read
literally, "conferred an American right of action which requires nothing more than that the
plaintiff be 'any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment' "
and "extended our law and opened our courts to all alien seafaring men injured anywhere
in the world in service of watercraft of every foreign nation." Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 576-77(1953). Given this potentially unlimited scope of application, the Court enu-
merated a seven factor test under the choice of laws principle in order to narrow the
breadth of the Act. These factors were: 1) the place of the wrongful act; 2) the law of the
vessel's flag; 3) the domicile or allegiance of the injured; 4) the allegiance of the defend-
ant shipowner; 5) the place where the contract was entered into; 6) the inaccessibility of a
foreign forum; and 7) the law of the forum. Id. at 583-91.
19921
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explicitly limited the scope of the Act by restricting its application to
seamen on "American vessels" who were "engaged in commerce" or
employed "by an enterprise engaged in commerce." 44 Given the pa-
rameters drawn by the language of the FLSA, Judge Rosenn rea-
soned that the formula was self-defining. 45 Accordingly, if a plaintiff
seaman fell within the statutory requirements of the Act and no stat-
utorily prescribed exemption applied, he would be entitled to cover-
age.46 To view a FLSA case under any standard other than statutory
interpretation, Judge Rosenn contended, would be to hold the
power of Congress to legislate subordinate to the court's ability to
invoke choice of laws. 47
2. Finding the Plaintiffs not "In Commerce" within the FLSA
Addressing the issue in terms of statutory interpretation, Judge
Rosenn concluded that the while the plaintiffs were "seamen" on an
"American vessel," and thus met one of the statutory requirements
of the FLSA, they failed to meet the "in commerce" requirement of
the Act.48 Focusing, in part, on the definition of "commerce" pro-
vided in title 29,49 and referring to the legislative history of the Act,
Judge Rosenn decided that the FLSA was manifestly designed and
structured to be confined in its application to the United States or to
44 Cmu, 932 F.2d at 224. The court stated that:
Congress, in enacting the FLSA, explicitly considered the reach of the
Act. Unlike the Jones Act, whose literal interpretation would apply to
seamen injured everywhere in the world, Congress has limited the applicabil-
ity of the FLSA to seamen and other employees by imposing certain require-
ments. To be covered by the FLSA seamen must meet a two-part
requirement. First, the seamen must be engaged "in commerce" or em-
ployed by an "enterprise engaged in commerce." See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1988). Second, the seaman must be employed on an American vessel. See
29 U.S.C. 213(a)(14) (1988). If the plaintiffs in the present case meet the
FLSA's two prong requirement and no statutory exemption applies, then
they are entitled to the protection of the FLSA.
Id.
45 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 224.
46 Id.
47 id. To support further the argument that the question subjudice was appropriately
addressed in terms of statutory interpretation instead of choice of law, the court referred
to the case of Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) (addressing applicabil-
ity of the FLSA to employees working on United states military base located in Bermuda),
and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (determining whether
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is applicable to United States citizens employed
abroad by U.S. employers). Id. at 224-25. The court also referred to Windward Shipping(London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974) (determining whether the
National Labor Relations Act applied to U.S. nationals picketing foreign vessels) and Mc-
Culloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963)(determining
whether the National Labor Relations Act applied to U.S. nationals picketing foreign ves-
sels), as further support for the proposition that the issue should be addressed in statutory
interpretation terms. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 225.
48 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 225.
49 As defined in title 29: " 'Commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation,
transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any
place outside thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1988).
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the territories specifically enumerated in section 213(f). 50 Contin-
gent to this analysis, Judge Rosenn refused to recognize an American
flag vessel as United States territory within the meaning of the com-
merce clause of the FLSA, noting that the concept of a vessel as a
piece of national territory was merely a necessary "legal fiction"
meant to direct the basic functioning of a vessel and not a true indi-
cator of the vessel's nationality for all purposes. 51 Judge Rosenn
maintained that even if the vessel was viewed as United States terri-
tory, since it was not among those territories enumerated by section
213(f), it was still excluded from coverage of the seamen under the
foreign workplace exemption. 52
3. Finding the Corporate Defendants not Enterprises Engaged
"In Commerce"
Addressing the argument that the plaintiffs were employed by
50 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 226. The court stated that:
The language of FLSA and its legislative history show that Congress in-
tended the Act to establish minimum wage and maximum hour standards for
workers employed in the domestic economy. [footnote omitted]. Congress'
express purpose in passing FLSA was to protect a substantial portion of the
national work force from sub-standard wages and excessive hours which en-
dangered the national health and well-being and, as a result 'the free move-
ment of goods in interstate commerce.' Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil,
324 U.S. 697, 706, 65 S.Ct. 895,902, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945). Congress found
that the channels and instrumentalities of commerce were being used to
Ispread an perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several
states . . .' and therefore enacted FLSA in 1938 for the purpose of rectifying
labor conditions which were detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of
workers.
29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988) (emphasis added).
Thus, the FLSA defines 'in commerce' to include only those economics
activities which 'touch' the United States at some point. Section 203(b) of
the FLSA defines commerce as 'trade, commerce, transportation, transmis-
sion, or communication among the several States or between any State and
any place outside thereof.' 29 U.S.C. § 203(c) defines any State as 'any State
of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or posses-
sion of the United States.'
Id.
For the territories enumerated within section 213(0 of the FLSA, see supra note 34.
51 Id. at 227-28. The court stated that:
'Flags of convenience' are a comparatively new phenomenon developed after
the conclusion of World War II by certain non-traditional maritime countries
for economic reasons. The state whose flag was flown exercised 'minimum
control over the activities and operations of these vessels.' Ebere Osieke,
Flags of Convenience Vessels: Recent Developments 73 AM.J. OF INT'L L. 604 (1979).
It is generally understood among nations engaged in maritime practice that
the state whose flag is flown exercises control over matters such as the quali-
fication of masters and officers of the ship, safety of the seas, discipline
aboard the vessel, and investigations into instances of navigation causing de-
struction of life or serious physical damage.
Id. at 227. Presumably, if the vessels were territories regarded as states within the FLSA's
definition of "commerce," the sailors could have been viewed as fulfilling that prong of the
requirement.
52 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 227.
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an enterprise engaged in commerce, due either to their connection'
to Chesapeake Shipping as a separate entity, or due to their connec-
tion to all the defendants collectively, Judge Rosenn opined that the
activities carried on by Chesapeake Shipping were not sufficient to
constitute "commerce" within the ambit of the FLSA, since they
were conducted only to comply with the technical aspects of reflag-
ging.53 He further noted that the defendants collectively were not
acting towards a "common business purpose," as required under the
section's definition of "enterprise. ' 54 Though Judge Rosenn ulti-
mately conceded that Chesapeake Shipping could stand as the enter-
prise for purposes of the statute, he dismissed this potential
alternative by concluding that the uniqueness of the situation pre-
cluded Chesapeake Shipping from engaging in commerce within the
meaning of the FLSA.55
B. Judge Cowen - The Choice of Laws Approach
1. Applying a Choice of Laws Approach
Concurring in the judgment only,Judge Cowen wrote a separate
opinion asserting that choice of laws principles governed the dispute
before the court and precluded the application of United States
law. 56 Applying the criteria delineated in the Lauritzen-Romero-
Rhoditis 57 triad of cases, Judge Cowen reasoned that of the eight fac-
tors58 enumerated in those cases, only the law of the flag and the law
3 Id. at 228. Judge Rosenn discounted the chartering of the vessels through the
corporation, its purchase of supplies through the U.S. and the telecommunications that it
maintained with the vessels as actions secondary to and produced only by compliance with
the reflagging requirements. Id. Judge Rosenn noted that since the reflagging was con-
ducted for purely political purposes, it did not alter the entirely foreign character of the
shipping operation. Id. He similarly discounted as insufficient to establish contact, the
petroleum transhipped from the vessels to the United States via Europe. Id.
54 Id. at 229-30. "Enterprise" is defined within title 29 as:
[Tihe related activities performed (either through unified operation or com-
mon control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and
includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments
or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including depart-
ments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall
not include the related activities performed for such enterprise by an in-
dependent contractor....
29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1988).
55 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 230. The court conceded that a company such as Chesapeake,
chartered under United States laws and purchasing goods within the United States would
normally be considered an enterprise engaged in commerce, but stated that the Cruz mat-
ter represented "an extraordinarily unique situation" and consequently placed the corpo-
ration outside of the section's ambit. Id. at 231.
56 Id. at 233 (CowenJ., concurring).
57 See supra notes 27-29.
58 Crz, 932 F.2d at 233. The factors these cases are: "(1) the place of injury; (2) the
country of the ship's flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; (4) the
allegiance of the shipowner; (5) the place of contract; (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign
forum; (7) the law of the forum; and (8) the defendant's base of operations." Id. (citing
Matute v. Procoast Navigation Ltd., 928 F.2d 627, 631-32 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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of the forum favored the exercise of American jurisdiction. 59 Dis-
missing the plaintiffs' argument that the law of the flag should domi-
nate the balancing of interests, Judge Cowen concluded that foreign
law controlled the dispute before the court. 60 Thus, by finding insuf-
ficient grounds for jurisdiction, Judge Cowen did not address the
question of whether the Filipino seamen were covered under the
FLSA. 6 1
2. Defending Application of the Choice of Laws Principle
In addressing the contention of Judges Rosenn and Alito that a
choice of laws analysis was inapplicable to the present dispute, Judge
Cowen asserted that the FLSA was drafted by Congress in such a
manner as to make a choice of laws evident within its provisions. 6 2
Citing to the Supreme Court decision of EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co. (ARAMCO),6 3 as a guide for determining when Congress dictates
a choice of laws application, Judge Cowen stated that legislation is
"presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States," and that absent a strong affirmative showing to the
contrary, any law should be regarded as presumptively domestic in
application. 4 Noting that the Court in ARAMCO observed that if
"Congress intended Title VII to apply overseas, it would have ad-
dressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures,"
Judge Cowen reasoned that if, in drafting the FLSA, Congress had
intended to resolve a potential conflict of laws problem in favor of
American law, it was required to state so plainly within the statute.
65
Since the provisions of the FLSA did not specifically address the
question of whether American law was to prevail in a conflict, Judge
Cowen concluded that a choice of laws analysis was necessary in the
present case to determine whether United States law should be
applied. 66
59 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 233.
60 Id. In a footnote, Judge Cowen dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that the law of
the flag alone should have dictated application of United States law under the choice of
laws standard, noting that the standard required application of seven other factors. Id. at
n.2. Also by way of footnote, Judge Cowen observed that the plaintiffs' contacts with the
United States were so insignificant as to preclude application of American law, but he
offered that had the plaintiffs been domiciled in the United States, American law would
likely have applied. Id. at 234 n.3. He did not propose which foreign nation's laws would
apply to the dispute. Id. at 233 n.l.
61 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 233.
62 Id. at 234-35.
63 I11 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
64 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 234 (quoting ARAMCO, 111 S. Ct. at 1230).
65 Id. (quoting ARAMCO, 11l S. Ct. at 1234).
66 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 234-35.
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C. Judge Alito - Legislative Intent
1. Finding the Statutory Language Ambiguous
Dissenting from the court's holding and advancing that neither
strict statutory interpretation of the section's language nor choice of
laws analysis was adequate to resolve the issues before the court,
Judge Alito examined the Act's legislative history and concluded that
Congress intended the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA to ap-
ply to all seamen on American flag vessels. 6 7 To determine whether
Congress specifically dictated a choice of laws in the language of the
FLSA, he argued that the statute could be read either to preclude a
choice of laws application or to leave the choice of laws question
open. 68 Due to the possibility of such conflicting readings, Judge
Alito believed that examination of the legislative history of the Act
was the only way to divine congressional intent.6 9 Examining the
evolution of the statute, he concluded that Congress unambiguously
intended for minimum wage provisions to apply to all seamen on
American vessels.7 0 Given this, Judge Alito averred that application
of choice of laws principles would frustrate congressional intent
since it could possibly deny coverage to the plaintiff class. 7 1
In examining the commerce requirement of the FLSA, Judge Al-
ito advanced that the definition of "commerce" was ambiguous with
regard to American vessels engaged in trade among foreign ports.72
He reasoned that while such trade was not literally trade between the
states, or between a state and any place outside thereof, a less literal
interpretation of "states" could well place a vessel flying the Ameri-
can flag within the purview of the FLSA as a territory or possession,
since vessels flying the flag of a nation have been viewed as "part of
the territory of [the] nation."' 73 Given the potential for ambiguity,
Judge Alito posited that since seamen did not originally have to com-
port with any commerce requirement, Congress could not have envi-
67 Id. at 235 (Alito, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 235-36. Judge Alito observed that the language could be read as a "statutory
directive to apply American law (the FLSA minimum wage provision), thus precluding
application of non-statutory choice-of-law principles." Id. at 236. On the other hand, the
language could be regarded as a way to "merely specify the minimum wage rate for
seamen on American vessels in those instances in which in which the choice of American
law is appropriate." Id.
69 Id. at 236.
70 Id. at 236-37. Judge Alito focused primarily on the evolution of 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(a). He also cited to a Senate Report to the 1961 amendment of the section which
referred to FLSA coverage of "American-flag vessels" and "vessels documented or num-
bered under the laws of the United States." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 32 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620-51.
71 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 237.
72 Id. For a definition of "commerce" within the FLSA, see supra note 49. "State" is
defined within the Act as "any state of the United States or the District of Columbia or any
Territory or possession of the United States." 29 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1988).
73 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 237-38 (quoting Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 176 (1903)).
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sioned that seamen might eventually be denied coverage under the
FLSA because of such a requirement. 74
2. Considering a United States Flagged Vessel as United States
Territory
Judge Alito last addressed the issue of the foreign workplace ex-
emption in the FLSA.75 He asserted that a United States flagged ves-
sel was regarded as part of the United States and did not come within
the ambit of the foreign workplace exemption. 76 He similarly re-
jected a reading which regarded an American vessel as a foreign
workplace while it was in a foreign country, since such an interpreta-
tion would then prove impracticable since a ship would venture into
and out of FLSA coverage as it travelled between ports.77 Judge Al-
ito referred to the Act's legislative history to support this contention
and concluded by noting that Congress extended coverage to all
seamen on American vessels and gave no indication that it only in-
tended the FLSA to apply to such vessels while in American territo-
rial waters. 78 Therefore, he concluded that an American flagged
vessel should not be regarded as coming within the purview of the
foreign workplace exemption. 79
IV. Background Law: Admiralty Law and the Question of
Jurisdiction
It is a fundamental tenet of international law that a country is
free to regulate the requirements for registry of vessels under its na-
tional flag.80 The extent to which the flag imbues exclusive jurisdic-
74 Id. at 238. Judge Alito compared excerpted language from the 1961 amended
minimum wage provision Pub.L. 87-30, § 5(b), 75 Stat. 65 (1961), with 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)
which included the commerce requirement. Id. Judge Alito asserted that this requirement
arose as a "technical amendment" to the statute in 1966 which was not intended to affect
any substantive changes. Id.
75 Id. at 238-39. For text of the foreign territories exemption clause, 29 U.S.C.
213(0, see supra note 34.
76 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 238-39.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 239.
80 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAw §§ 501, 502 (1987); BOLESLAW BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 100-01
(1962); Jane M. Wells, Comment, Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries, 6 MAR. LAw.
221 (1981).
The 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, article 5 states in part:
Each state shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships,
for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.
Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly.
There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular,
the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administra-
tive, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 (hereinafter Convention on the High Seas).
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tion upon the state of registry, however, is an issue of some
uncertainty and one which has been periodically addressed by
United States courts over the past century. 8' In part, this problem
has been compounded by the rise of "Flags of Convenience" vessels,
ships owned by nationals of one country, but registered nominally
under the flag of another country for various economic reasons.82
Beyond the Flags of Convenience issue, the very nature of interna-
tional shipping necessitates that a vessel is often subject to the laws
of many nations.83
Ostensibly, a vessel is subject to the laws of its country of regis-
try,84 to international law,8 5 and to the laws of countries at which it
docks.8 6 It may also be subject to the laws of the country of which
the ship's owner is a national or where the majority of stockholders
reside.8 7 Given these vying sovereign authorities, the international
81 See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970)(United States court
exercised jurisdiction over Greek flagged vessel). Under the Convention on the High
Seas, a vessel on the high seas is subject exclusively to the law of the flag state. See also
Elizabeth P. DeVine, Comment, The Long Arm of Federal Courts: Domestic Jurisdiction on the
High Seas 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269 (1980) (citing Convention on the High Seas). A
warship may board a foreign vessel, however, if that vessel is suspected to be engaged in
slave trade or piracy or if the vessel is of the same nationality. Id. at 271 n.20.
82 For a more thorough definition of "Flags of Convenience" vessels, see infra notes
242-45 and accompanying text.
83 There has been considerable disagreement over the type of jurisdiction which a
nation exerts over its merchant vessels, but the fact remains that a vessel is subject to the
laws of the nation whose flag it flies. BURDICK H. BRITrIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGO-
ING OFFICERS 132 (1986). One theory holds that a vessel is a floating part of a nation's
territory, and that an individual aboard the vessel is bound by the laws of the nation as if
within the state itself. Id. The theory countering this asserts that the jurisdiction is not
territorial, but rather one born of necessity and exercised over the persons and property of
its nationals. Id.
84 See supra note 80. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 501-
02 (1987).
85 See, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, supra note 80, art. 1, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82. Generally, registration under a nation's flag entitles a vessel to privileges,
immunities and international comity accorded under domestic and international law. Mer-
edith L. Hathorn, Note, The Vessel Documentation Act of 1980, 7 MAR. LAW. 303 (1982). In a
broad sense, international law governs the relation between ships. See BRITrIN, supra note
83, at 131.
86 A vessel docked in a foreign port is typically subject to laws governing matters such
as immigration, customs, health, and safety. BOCZEK, supra note 80, at 160. When a vessel
enters a foreign port, the foreign nation obtains jurisdiction that is considered to be con-
current with the flag state. Laura L. Roos, Comment, Stateless Vessels and the High Seas Nar-
cotics Trade: United States Courts Deviate From International Principles ofJurisdiction, 9 MAR. LAW.
273, 278 (1984).
87 See, e.g., Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977) (United States law applied to vessel on basis that most of
its voyages were to or from United States ports); Hellenic Line Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S.
306, 307 (1970) (upholding United States jurisdiction over Greek flagged vessel based on
fact that 95% of shipping company's stocks were owned by United States citizens); Bobo-
lakis v. Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A., 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (holding that majority ownership and control by Americans of Panamanian corpora-
tion owning Panamanian vessel sufficient to give court subject matter jurisdiction in Greek
seaman's claim underJones Act). American courts, in particular, have rejected the theory
of"vested rights" and have recognized that the fact that one jurisdiction may apply its laws
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nature of the trade, and the often multinational nature of the individ-
uals who make up the crews of these vessels, it is apparent that any
conflict affecting a vessel may involve the laws and interests of sev-
eral countries. 88 The threshold question to any adjudication, there-
fore, is on what basis may jurisdiction be founded.
Generally, United States courts are disinclined to impose any
federal law extraterritorially without direction from the constitution-
ally mandated authority of Congress to legislate exclusively with re-
gard to commerce with foreign nations89  and without full
consideration of the potential impact, political as well as legal, of any
decision the court might render. There has been a "long standing
tradition of restraint in applying United States laws to foreign
ships." 90 With respect to United States labor laws, in particular,
there is a general policy against their extraterritorial application. 9'
Yet, where Congress has elected to impose federal labor legislation
on foreign vessels,92 and where that intent has been manifest, the
does not preclude another jurisdiction from applying its laws. Harold Watson, Transna-
tional Maritime Litigation: Selected Problems, 8 MAR. LAW. 87, 88, 90-91 (1983).
88 See Watson, supra note 87, at 87. Watson notes:
Maritime litigation is frequently 'transnational' in a number of respects.
Foreign law may govern the controversy; evidence may be sought to be ob-
tained in various countries. Moreover, the courts of different nations may
take jurisdiction over a single dispute. The courts of one nation may be
asked to give effect to proceedings in another country, or to decline jurisdic-
tion so that a particular case may be litigated elsewhere, or even to enjoin the
parties from proceeding in another forum.
Id.
89 See U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
90 International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 221 (1982).
Despite the fact that the tradition of restraint may have been long-standing, there has long
been precedent upon which the United States could exert jurisdiction over foreign vessels
outside of United States territorial waters. In The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 368-69
(1885), the Court first pronounced a general rule which gave the United States admiralty
jurisdiction over foreign vessels involved in collisions. Patricia A. Krebs, United States Admi-
ralty Jurisdiction Over Collisions On The High Seas: Forum Non Conveniens And Substantive Law, 9
MAR. LAw. 43, 46 (1984). The Court, in The Belgenland, listed seven factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether to exert jurisdiction over cases between the foreign parties.
These factors were similar to those enumerated by the Lauitzen-Romero-Rhoditis triad sev-
eral decades later. The Belgenland factors were: 1) whether the foreign laws govern the
matter; 2) whether the parties would experience difficulty in turning to their respective
nations' courts; 3) whether the parties to the case had agreed upon a court; 4) the consent
of the consul in wage cases; 5) convenience or international comity; and 6) any applicable
treaties. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. at 363-64.
91 Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing McCul-
loch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963); see also
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949)). The case of Benz v. Compania Naviera Hi-
dalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (refusing to apply the National Labor Management Act of
1947 to litigation stemming from American Union's picketing of a foreign vessel), is con-
sidered the leading authority representing the proposition that express congressional au-
thorization is required for American labor law to apply to the internal regulation of foreign
ships. BOCZEK, supra note 80, at 171.
92 See BOCZEK, supra note 80, at 161 n.21, (citing 23 Stat. 55 (1884); 46 U.S.C. § 599
(barring advance payment of wages to seaman with specific reference to foreign vessels);
Rev. Stat. § 4529 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1952) (providing for immediate payment of
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Supreme Court has upheld the application of American law.93 Ab-
sent a specific statement of intent by Congress that the statute is in-
tended for extraterritorial application, however, the Court has either
immediately declined to construe a statute as applicable to a foreign
vessel 94 or has attempted to glean congressional intent and evalu-
ated American interests before asserting or declining jurisdiction. 95
Unlike domestic litigation, where statutory and procedural rules
dictate the appropriate forum, international litigation is often uncer-
tain in this regard. 9 6 Where two forums are available to the plaintiff,
a court may dispose of a suit by invoking the doctrine of forum non
conveniens,9 7 to avoid the difficulties inherent in applying foreign
law.98 This procedural expedient allows a court to waive its power to
seaman in specific circumstances); Rev. Stat. 4530 (1875); 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1952) (provid-
ing that seaman on American and foreign vessels could secure one-half of earned wages
while vessel in American waters); 38 Stat. 1164 (1915); Rev. Stat. § 4527 (1875), 46 U.S.C.
§ 594 (1952) (allowing unlawfully discharged seaman right to one month's wages). See also
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963)
("Congress has constitutional power to apply the National Labor Relations Act to the
crews working foreign-flag ships, at least while they are in American waters.").
93 See BOCZEK, supra note 80, at 161 (citing Patterson v. The Bark Eudora, 190 U.S.
169 (1903) (upholding application to British vessel of statute prohibiting advance payment
of wages to seaman); Strathearn Steamship Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920) (British
national shipped on British ship in British port allowed to collect one half wages when
vessel put in at U.S. port)). The United States has also extended federal law beyond the
boundaries of territorial jurisdiction to persons outside those limits when those persons
threaten to violate American law or to endanger United States interests. DeVine, supra
note 81, at 274. On this general basis, United States courts have extended the reach of
United States federal law into international boundaries of the high seas on matters pertain-
ing to the transport of narcotics. Ronald C. Curtis, Note, The Outer Limits ofJurisdiction on
the High Seas: United States v. Romero-Galue and United States v. Alvarez-Mena 5 Wis. INT'L L. J.
222 (1987). See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (1lth Cir. 1985)
(holding that Congress intended the Marijuana on the High Seas Act to apply to foreign
seamen onboard foreign vessels); United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir.
1985) (upholding United States jurisdiction over a marijuana-carrying, stateless vessel on
the high seas); See also United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd
sub nom., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 753
(1991) (holding vessel flying flag of United Kingdom subject to United States jurisdiction
under Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act). On the basis of the Wildenhus's Case, 120
U.S. I (1887), the United States can similarly exercise jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels
when they are involved in matters which disturb the domestic peace. Marian N. Leich,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 6 AM.J. INT'L L. 612, 624
(1986).
94 See BOCZEK, supra note 80, at 161-62 (citing Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185
(1918) (holding that statute barring advance payment of seamen applied only to payments
made in U.S. ports, and not foreign ports).
95 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. International Termi-
nal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306
(1970).
96 See Watson, supra note 87, at 87.
97 Issues to be considered for forum non conveniens purposes are: 1) accessibility of
witnesses; 2) availability evidence; 3) expense of litigation; 4) ease of litigation; 5) en-
forceability of the court's holding; 6) the burden on local courts; 7) the appropriateness
of a local forum; and 8) the law to be applied. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
508-09 (1947).
98 Albert Tate, Jr., Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V and Choice of Law: What W1as All the Fuss
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exercise jurisdiction at its discretion.99 When the court is required
to establish the applicable law which will determine the rights of the
parties, however, a choice of laws analysis is applied.100
When a choice of laws evaluation is appropriate in admiralty ac-
tions, courts have conducted the evaluation by applying a standard
derived from the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis 101 triad of cases. Arising
from litigation involving the Jones Act, ' 0 2 which provided redress for
seamen injured in the course of their employment, these cases fash-
ioned a standard to restrict the overly broad language of the stat-
ute.' 0 3 In addition to establishing an eight part test for determining
whether United States law is applicable under choice of laws princi-
ples, 10 4 a general doctrine emerged from these cases which can be
characterized as favoring a balance of divergent interests and en-
couraging restraint on the exercise of sovereign authority.10 5
V. Analysis of Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.
The holding of Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. represents an ero-
sion of the doctrine which accords particular primacy to the law of
the flag in matters of maritime import and a deterioration of the doc-
trine which regards seamen as "wards" of the admiralty court. Con-
currently, the dicta of the court illustrates the conflict that can arise
when there is juristic disagreement as to whether a statute is extra-
territorially self-limiting, and thereby proscribing an application of
choice of laws principles, or whether it lacks an explicit indication of
congressional intent sufficient to trigger application of a choice of
About? And What The Fuss Should Have Been About (Maybe), 7 MAR. LAw. 199, 201-02 (1982);
Watson, supra note 87, at 89.
99 See Tate, supra note 98, at 202; Watson, supra note 87, at 89.
100 See Watson, supra note 87, at 88. The doctrine offorum non conveniens and choice of
laws principles are interrelated to a degree, but the extent of this relationship has proved a
source of confusion in maritime jurisprudence. See Tate, supra note 98, at 201. It has been
suggested that there are, in actuality, relatively few maritime conflict of law cases because
of the similarity between United States law and the maritime laws of many nations.
Symeon Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts of Law From the Perspective of Modern Choice of Law
Methodology, 7 MAR. LAw. 223, 224 (1982).
101 See supra notes 27-29.
102 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
10s As originally codified, the language of the Jones Act, if read literally, allowed any
seaman, even if foreign and of a foreign vessel, recourse through the American courts. An
employer's lability under this Act consequently represented a very liberal theory of recov-
ery available to a seaman for personal injury. In general, if the seaman can succeed in
bringing suit in an American court, it is likely that he will obtain a more substantial recov-
ery. Paul H. Due, Rights of Foreign Seamen in American Courts - The Law Into the '80s, 7 MAR.
LAw. 265 (1982).
104 Those factors are: "1) the place of injury; 2) the country of the ship's flag 3) the
allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; 4) the allegiance of the shipowner; 5) the
place of contract; 6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; 7) the law of the forum; and
8) the defendant's base of operations." Matute v. Procoast Navigation Ltd., 928 F.2d 627,
631-32 (3d Cir. 1991)).
105 BOCZEK, supra note 80, at 165.
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laws analysis to assess its applicability abroad. Tangentially, Cruz un-
derscores the uncertainty of the specific relation that a flagged vessel
can have with its registering country.
A. The Issues Presented
Cruz presented essentially two questions for the court to con-
sider. First, the court had to address the threshold question of
whether the plaintiff seamen were entitled to bring suit in a United
States federal court. 10 6 Second, assuming the court answered the
first question in the affirmative, the court then had to determine
whether the plaintiffs were entitled to coverage under the FLSA.
B. Are the Plaintif's Entitled to a United States Forum?
The threshold question ofjurisdiction and the division it created
within the panel is most clearly illustrated by the different ap-
proaches employed by Judges Rosenn and Cowen. Judge Rosenn
looked to the language of the statute to determine whether the plain-
tiffs came within the FLSA's jurisdictional reach and, hence, its provi-
sions. Judge Cowen, however, treated the plaintiffs' case as a
maritime matter automatically subject to a choice of laws scrutiny to
determine whether the seamen's claim was properly submitted to ad-
judication in American courts. Judge Cowen looked to the Act's lan-
guage only to determine whether the statute explicitly dictated the
application of American law in a conflict of laws situation. Failing to
find such an explicit reference, he applied the balancing test of the
Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis triad and concluded that American interests
were insufficient to justify granting the plaintiffs a forum.
1. The Statutory Analysis Standard
The established canon of statutory construction dictates that the
text of a statute is controlling.' 0 7 Where statutory language is unam-
biguous, without "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the con-
trary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."'108
Further, with respect to the extraterritorial application of a statute,
the Supreme Court has noted that "it is a matter of statutory inter-
pretation as to whether or not statutes are effective beyond the na-
106 In maritime matters, jurisdiction is granted to federal courts by the U.S. Constitu-
tion and the Judiciary Act of 1789. Watson, supra note 87, at 87-88. The Constitution
provides that "[t]he judicial power shall extend ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. TheJudiciary Act of 1789 provides that "the
district courts shall . . . have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." Judiciary Act of 1798, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 77 (1789).
107 E.g., Consumer Products Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980).
Io8 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
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tional sovereignty. It depends upon the purpose of the statute."' 10 9
2. Examining the Approach of the Panel Members
On the basis afforded by these long prescribed principles of stat-
utory construction, Judge Rosenn appears to have initially followed a
standard most consistent with these directives."10 As Rosenn con-
tended, the Jones Act,"II which prompted the development of the
Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis standard, was overly expansive by virtue of
its language." 2 At the time of the triad's inception, the Jones Act
read, in pertinent part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common-law right or rem-
edy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply
113
As the Supreme Court in Lauritzen noted, this Act, if read literally,
"conferred an American right of action which requires nothing more
than that the plaintiff be 'any seaman who shall suffer personal injury
in the course of his employment'" and "extended our law and
opened our courts to all alien seafaring men injured anywhere in the
world in service of watercraft of every foreign nation."' '14 The stan-
dard initiated by the Court in Lauritzen and developed subsequently
by the Court in Romero and Rhoditis was designed specifically to limit
the expansive scope of this Act. The language of the FLSA, however,
is ostensibly self-limiting in that it confines its application to seamen
on American vessels engaged in commerce. The FLSA reads, in per-
tinent part:
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
work week is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, or is employed by an enterprise engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce ....
(1) not less than [the minimum wage] ....
109 Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 390 (1948).
110 As further support for the argument that the question sub judice was appropriately
addressed in terms of statutory interpretation instead of choice of law, the court referred
to to the following cases: Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) (address-
ing applicability of the FLSA to employees working on United states military base located
in Bermuda); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (determining
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is applicable to United States citizens
employed abroad by U.S. employers); Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Ra-
dio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974) (determining whether the National Labor Relations Act
applied to U.S. nationals picketing foreign vessels); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) ((determining whether the National Labor
Relations Act applied to U.S. nationals picketing foreign vessels). Cruz v. Chesapeake
Shipping Inc., 932 F.2d 219, 224-25 (1991).
111 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
112 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 224.
113 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
114 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1953).
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(4) If such employee is employed as a seaman on an American ves-
sel, not less than the rate which will provide to the employee, for the
period covered by the wage payment, wages equal to compensation
at the hourly rate prescribed by paragraph (1) of this subsection for
all hours during such period when he was actually on duty .... 115
Under the FLSA, if the plaintiff is a seaman on an American vessel
and is engaged in commerce or employed by an enterprise engaged
in commerce, he should be entitled to coverage.
Considering this, Judge Cowen's concurring opinion advocating
a choice of laws application is flawed in two respects. First, Judge
Cowen never completely reconciled his application of the choice of
laws standard with the canon of statutory construction which dictates
that the plain language of a statute is controlling absent legislative
intent to the contrary. As Judge Rosenn clearly delineated in his
opinion, the language applying the FLSA to seamen engaged in com-
merce on American vessels is outwardly self-limiting as coverage of
the Act applies only to individuals who fall within these specific pa-
rameters.1 16 This language is, therefore, controlling absent legisla-
tive history to the contrary. Judge Cowen, however, merely asserted
that a choice of laws analysis was applicable to the dispute as a mari-
time matter without any showing of legislative intent to suggest that
the language of the Act should not have controlled. 1 7 Such reason-
ing is fundamentally inconsistent, for the result of an automatic ap-
plication of the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis triad to all maritime
litigation involving statutory interpretation would make Congress'
ability to legislate subordinate to the court's ability to invoke choice
of laws principles.1 18
Second, as Judge Rosenn declared in his opinion, Judge Cowen
construed ARAMCO 119 to support a proposition incompatible with
its dicta. 120 Specifically, Judge Cowen cited to ARAMCO as control-
ling the court's disposition of the matter, and asserted that the case
sanctioned application of a choice of laws standard to the issue in
Cruz.12 1 In fact, the Supreme Court in ARAMCO stated that it
granted certiorari to resolve an "important issue of statutory interpreta-
tion."' 22 The Court in ARAMCO acknowledged that Congress had
authority to enforce laws beyond the territorial limits of the United
States, but asserted that it was a matter of statutory interpretation
whether Congress had exercised that prerogative.' 23 The Court
115 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a), (a)(1), (a)(4) (1988).
116 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 224.
117 Id. at 233 (Cowen, J., concurring).
118 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 224.
119 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
120 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 225 n.6.
121 Id. at 224.
122 EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991) (emphasis added).
123 Id.
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then observed: "It is a long-standing principle of American law 'that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.'" 124 Thus, the Court in ARAMCO clearly reasoned that ab-
sent a showing that Congress explicitly intended to legislate extrater-
ritorially, the presumption is that it intended to legislate only as to
domestic application.' 25
Judge Cowen posited that the absence of a specific declaration
by Congress resolving conflicts between the FLSA and the laws of
other nations, indicated silence on the choice of laws issue and thus
prompted the application of a choice of laws analysis.' 26 Despite the
fact that Judge Cowen clearly referred to the presumption of territo-
riality in the preceding paragraph, 127 he failed to give effect to the
clearly stated rubric which dictates that the absence of a positive
statement of intent to the contrary triggers the presumption that ex-
traterritorial application was not intended. Therefore, in Cruz, the
presumption operated against a choice of laws analysis since the very
application of such an analysis assumes the possibility of extraterrito-
rial application. With regard to maritime matters, ARAMCO does
not stand for the proposition that the absence of a congressional
declaration that American law is to prevail over foreign law in a con-
flict means that a choice of laws evaluation must be applied. Rather,
it'stands for the proposition that the absence of reference to a possi-
ble conflict of laws gives rise to the presumption of territoriality.' 28
While looking to the legislative history of an act is an accepted
method of statutory interpretation when the language is ambiguous
or is clearly at odds with the congressional intent behind the statute,
Judge Alito began his dissenting opinion by attempting to resolve
the choice of laws issue.129 In so doing, he, like Judge Cowen, failed
to address specifically the issue of whether the language of the FLSA
was self-limiting. Nevertheless, it is implicit in Judge Alito's treat-
ment of the issue that he considered the language of the FLSA not to
be self-confining, as he examined the language of the statute for a
specific indication of an avowed congressional intent as to choice of
laws.13 0 He argued that while a choice of laws was not specifically
enunciated within the statute, the legislative history of the Act pro-
vided adequate indication of congressional intent with respect to the
124 Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
125 Id.
126 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 234-35.
127 Id. at 234.
128 See also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (holding that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within territorial juris-
diction of the United States").
129 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 235.
130 Id. at 235-36.
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extraterritorial application of the statute.' 3 ' While Judge Alito's ap-
proach to the issue comports generally with established methods of
statutory interpretation, his opinion never addresses the language of
the statute in a straight forward manner, but only does so tangen-
tially in his argument concerning the legislative history.
In sum, given the very specific and limiting language of the.
FLSA and the definitions provided within the Act for its key
words, 132 it is clear that the statutory language should control. An
automatic application of choice of laws principles through the Laurit-
zen-Romero-Rhoditis triad not only circumvents compliance with the
established canon of statutory interpretation, but, as Judge Rosenn
noted, it holds Congress' ability to legislate subordinate to the
court's power to invoke choice of laws to govern the application of
the law.
C. Are the Plaintifs within Coverage of FLSA ?
Writing for the court, Judge Rosenn clearly pronounced that a
choice of laws analysis of the case was inappropriate. 133 Accord-
ingly, he addressed the plaintiffs' case under statutory interpretation
standards.' 3 4 Under such an appraisal Judge Rosenn declined to ad-
judge the plaintiffs within coverage of the FLSA, finding that they
failed to meet the "in commerce" requirement of the FLSA.' 3 5 In so
holding, however, Judge Rosenn failed to comply with the standards
of statutory interpretation.
1. Straying from Statutory Interpretation Standards - Piercing
the Corporate Veil
Judge Rosenn correctly found the plaintiff seamen within the
first prong of the FLSA coverage,' 3 6 but his analysis began to stray
from methods of strict statutory construction when he analyzed
whether the defendants had served in an enterprise engaged in com-
131 Id. at 236-37.
132 The Act defines "commerce," "industry," American vessel," "enterprise," and
"state" among others. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
133 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 224.
134 Id. at 225-32.
135 Id. at 232.
136 Id. at 225. The court wrote:
The eleven reflagged tankers squarely meet the definition of an Ameri-
can vessel provided in FLSA. These eleven vessels were documented under
the laws of the United States so that they were permitted to fly the American
flag. The plaintiffs also meet the definition of seamen: the employees per-
form 'service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of such
vessel as a means of transportation.' 29 C.F.R. § 783.31. Thus, the plaintiffs
have met one prong of the two prong requirement for seamen to come under
the FLSA.
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merce 13 7 Judge Rosenn correctly excluded the Gleneagle Ship
Management Company from part of the enterprise argument since it
was an independent corporation with no affiliation to the other de-
fendants other than by contract.' 3 8 Looking to the remaining corpo-
rate entities, however, Judge Rosenn reasoned that the Kuwaiti-
owned Santa Fe International Corporation was not engaged in a
business purpose common to that of Chesapeake Shipping.'3 9 Judge
Rosenn's reasoning in this part of his opinion seems labored and
fundamentally flawed. Indeed it is quite reasonable to view Chesa-
peake Shipping and the other defendants as having been engaged in
the common business purpose of transporting petroleum products.
Though "[t]here must be more than a common goal to make a profit
for the business purpose requirement,"'' 40 the fact that the Santa Fe
International Corporation was wholly owned by the defendant Ku-
wait Petroleum Company, and was under a management contract to
perform services for the defendant Chesapeake Shipping, seems suf-
ficient evidence that these corporations were pursuing a common
business purpose. Within the context of this case, the purpose of
Chesapeake Shipping and the Santa Fe International Corporation
was to advance the business ventures of the Kuwait Petroleum Com-
pany in the carriage of petroleum products from the Persian Gulf. At
the least, the existence of Chesapeake Shipping allowed the safe
transport of Kuwait Petroleum Company oil since it was only by its
charter that the tankers were reflagged under the United States
ensign.
Judge Rosenn carefully examined the specific arrangements be-
tween the corporate entities in what was ostensibly an attempt to
pierce the corporate veil, but his efforts were largely superfluous. A
court pierces the corporate veil to determine what entity truly lies
behind facades of ownership and layers of corporate structure. In
this case, though, the fact remained that no matter how the structure
was analyzed, the ultimate owner would always prove to be the Ku-
wait Petroleum Company, a corporation the United States govern-
ment recognized. The corporations subsidiary to Kuwait Petroleum
Corporation were similarly recognized by the U.S. government.
These entities clearly served in capacities common to the business
purpose of Kuwait Petroleum Company.
The definition of "enterprise" as provided in title 29 utilizes lan-
guage to bring all the commonly owned defendants within its scope
despite the complexity of the corporate structure. The definition
reads:
137 Id. at 229-30.
138 Id. at 229.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 230 (quoting Donovan v. Easton Land & Development, Inc., 723 F.2d 1549,
1551 (1lth Cir. 1984)).
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[Tihe related activities performed (either through unified operation
or common control) by any person or persons for a common busi-
ness purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in
one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other
organizational units including departments of an establishment op-
erated through leasing arrangements, but shall not include the re-
lated activities mfformed for such enterprise by an independent
contractor ....
This language is clearly very expansive. Judge Rosenn, contrary to
the broad scope of the language and the obvious intent of the sec-
tion, appeared to use the very complexity of the corporate arrange-
ments made through Kuwait Petroleum Company and Chesapeake
Shipping as a means to exclude the commonly owned defendants
from enterprise liability.
In United States Tuna Corp. v. United States,14 2 a suit brought by a
Philippine corporation to recover damages for the sinking of its ves-
sel after a collision with a United States destroyer, the Ninth Circuit
declined to look beyond the corporate veil in order to treat the cor-
poration as an American shipowner. Specifically, despite the fact
that ninety-nine percent of the corporate stock was owned by Ameri-
can citizens, the court rejected the corporation's attempts to "pierce
its own veil for its own benefit."' 4 3 The court observed:
The reasons for disallowing such practice are obvious, the corpora-
tion could receive the benefits of the corporate structure when it was
to its benefit to claim such an existence. On the other hand, the
corporation could disregard the commensurate liabilities when such
existence was not favorable simply by pointing to its "significant
contacts" with the United States. 4 4
By analyzing at length the relations of the various Kuwaiti corporat-
tions, Judge Rosenn attempted, in effect, to perform a similar service
for the defendant corporations. To view Chesapeake Shipping's cre-
ation and incorporation- as adequate to comport with United States
laws for the reflagging, but inadequate to place the foreign seamen
employed aboard the vessels within the purview of federal labor leg-
islation would be to afford the Kuwaiti government the benefits of
the Chesapeake corporation (United States naval escort), without the
commensurate liabilities (payment of minimum wage to crew) en-
tailed in such an enterprise.
2. Failing to Follow the Trend - The "in Commerce"
Requirement
It may be argued that Judge Rosenn failed to construe the "in
commerce" requirement of title 29 as broadly as the Supreme Court
141 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1988).
142 550 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1977).
143 Id. at 573.
144 Id.
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has previously done so and, in this sense, failed to follow the trend of
that the FLSA "has been construed liberally to apply to the furthest
reaches consistent with congressional direction."' 45 In Mitchell v.
Lublin, McGaughy & Associates,146 the Supreme Court held the activi-
ties of draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks, and stenographers engaged in ar-
chitectural and engineering planning were sufficiently related to the
ultimate functioning of entities such as air bases, roads, and televi-
sion installations so as to constitute engagement in commerce within
the meaning of the FLSA. Observing that the facilities literally
served a role in commerce, the Court noted that "such work is di-
rectly and vitally related to the functioning of these facilities because,
without the preparation of plans for guidance, the construction
could not be effected and the facilities could not function as
planned."1 47
Drawing a parallel to the facts in Cruz, the seamen aboard the
reflagged tankers served in a role vitally related to the commerce of
the United States. Specifically, the seamen served aboard vessels
whose presence functioned to keep neutral shipping safe in the Per-
sian Gulf and thus kept the West's shipping "pipeline" from the Gulf
open. Given the fact that oil from the Persian Gulf was absolutely
vital to the American economy and American commerce,' 48 the
seamen, in a very direct sense, kept American commerce functioning
by insuring the continued export of oil. 14 9
Such a view of the seamen is specifically supported in Mitchell v.
C. W. Vollmer & Co.' 50 The Supreme Court in Mitchell noted:
The test of whether an employee is "engaged in commerce" within
the meaning of the Act is whether the work is so directly and vitally
related to the functioning of an instrumentality or facility of inter-
state commerce as to be, in practical effect, a part of it, rather than
an isolated, local activity. '51
The Court considered "engaged in commerce," employees who con-
structed a canal within the United States since the canal itself was
related to commerce. Certainly it is plausible to say that the Filipino
seamen, employed aboard vessels whose presence served to insure
that a significant source of petroleum for the United States remained
accessible to American industry, were engaging in work that was "di-
145 Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 212.
148 President Reagan acknowledged that keeping the shipping lanes open served an
interest vital to Western economies since it allowed oil from the Persian Gulf to reach
Western markets. See Mertus, supra note 15, at 208 n.6 (citing N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1987 at
Al, col. 2).
149 See International Longshoremen's Assoc. v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982)
(holding labor union's refusal to unload vessels engaged in trade with the Soviet Union as
activity "in commerce").
150 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
151 Id. at 429.
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rectly and vitally related to the functioning or facility of interstate
commerce."1 52
3. Straying from Statutory Interpretation - The Enterprise
Commerce Requirement
Despite his strong advocacy for statutory interpretation stan-
dards, Judge Rosenn ultimately failed to comply fully with the canon
of statutory interpretation which dictates that the plain language of a
statute is controlling. Though Judge Rosenn offered a compelling
argument against application of a choice of laws standard, he em-
ployed a distinctly non-statutory juridical method to reject the plain-
tiffs' argument that Chesapeake Shipping Company was an
enterprise engaged in commerce by virtue of the supplies and equip-
ment it purchased on the American marketplace.' 53 Judge Rosenn
noted:
Under the plaintiff's rationale, a company chartered under an Amer-
ican state law that purchased goods in'the United States would be an
enterprise engaged in commerce and thus be required to comply
with FLSA. Normally this would be true. Here, however, we have
an extraordinarily unique situation. In the present case, Chesapeake
purchased the supplies solely to bring the eleven vessels into com-
pliance with Coast Guard regulations and not in the production of
goods or the performance of services for interstate commerce.
Compliance with these safety requirements was necessary for reflag-
ging, a decision entirely motivated by political reasons. 154
In this manner and by a method which most emulated the weighing
of various interests inherent to a choice of laws principle, Judge
Rosenn rejected an argument which was statutorily correct. In short,
though Chesapeake Shipping was an enterprise engaged in com-
merce within the terms of the FLSA, Judge Rosenn preempted a
viewing of the plaintiffs as employed by an enterprise engaged in
commerce on the basis that the activity fulfilling that requirement
was "entirely motivated by political reasons."' 55 In many respects,
and perhaps most reflected by this and by the following commen-
tary, 156 it is arguable thatJudge Rosenn either employed a choice of
laws analysis, or eschewed both the statutory interpretation standard
and the specific-factor Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis triad choice of laws
standard to adopt a more flexible choice of laws approach in which
he gave a less formalized consideration to the interests of sovereigns
involved.
152 Id. at 429-30.
153 Cnu, 932 F.2d at 230-31.
154 d. at 231.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 230-31. Judge Rosenn noted that the "symbolism" of the American flag "is
not a valid substitute for involvement in the American economy" and that the court was
asked to overthrow the contract of the seamen with the Philippines Overseas Employment
Administration "[w]ithout serving any interests or concerns of the United States." Id.
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Despite the fact that Judge Rosenn properly viewed the plain-
tiffs' claim under statutory interpretation standards, he ultimately de-
clined to apply fully its terms. Though done in a very few words and
towards the end of his opinion, Judge Rosenn effectively disclaimed
the standard whose application he so staunchly advocated through-
out most of his opinion. Clearly, under Judge Rosenn's reasoning,
the plaintiffs were employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce.
As seamen employed on American vessels, it necessarily follows that
the plaintiffs were rightfully entitled to the minimum wage provi-
sions of the FLSA. 157 Therefore, despite the fact that the Filipino
seamen met both prongs of the FLSA requirements Judge Rosenn
denied the plaintiffs coverage because of political considerations. In
this manner, Cruz represents a singular example of a court declining
coverage to the plaintiffs on the very grounds which the authoring
judge has spent substantial time repudiating. Beyond such a possi-
ble distinction, Cruz is also unique in a number of other respects.
D. Possible Distinctions applied to Cruz
Cruz is atypical in that, in very simplistic terms, it stems partially
from United States courts trying to resolve the issue of whether to
apply American law to a United States flagged vessel. Viewed in this
manner, it is almost perplexing that there should be any question as
to whether the seamen employed aboard United States vessels were
covered by United States legislation.' 5 8 In this vein, it is curious that
the court should consider application of United States legislation to
an American vessel as extraterritorial application. Contingent to
that distinction, Cruz is unique in that Judge Latchum of the district
court and Judge Cowen of the circuit court of appeals asserted that
the United States flag represented insufficient grounds on which to
apply U.S. law to the seamen employed onboard the vessels. Cruz
may erode the doctrine which dictates that the flagging country is the
sovereignty most entitled to adjudicate matters affecting the vessel.
Similarly, the holding of Cruz might represent an erosion of the doc-
trine which regards seamen as "wards of admiralty" entitled to pro-
tection from the over-reaching of shipowners. Lastly, Cruz, in
presenting the "unanticipated juxtaposition of foreign policy deci-
sion with domestic regulation,"' 1 9 is unusual in that it involved a
reflagging conducted due to political circumstances.
157 See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
158 This is particularly so when examining cases under the Jones Act in which United
States courts have asserted jurisdiction over foreign nationals. See supra note 87 and ac-
companying text. See also infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
159 Cruz, 932 F.2d at 219-20.
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1. Is a United States Vessel United States Territory?
In the case of The S.S. Lotus, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice observed that "a ship on the high seas is assimilated to
the territory of the State whose flag it flies... what occurs on board a
vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on the
territory of the State whose flag the ship flies."' 6 0 Despite the fact
that a United States vessel may be treated as subject to domestic leg-
islation in certain instances, it is apparent that the vessel is not com-
monly regarded literally as United States territory. Though federal
courts have noted that the "use of the word 'territories' depends on
the character and aim of the act,"'' they have also observed that
"[n]ormally the word 'territories' is used as including only the por-
tions of the United States territorial possessions which are organized
and exercising governmental functions under act of Congress."' 16 2
Indeed, in Lam Mow v. Nagle,163 the Ninth Circuit held that a
person born on a United States vessel was not born in the United
States for purposes of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Similarly, in United States v. Eastburn Marine Chem. Co., Inc., t64 a New
York district court held that an accident aboard a United States flag-
ged vessel in a Spanish port was not an accident on United States
territory for the purposes of a life insurance policy limiting coverage
to such territory. The court stated that "[e]ven though an American
flag ship may for some purposes be deemed juridically a part of the
United States, it does not follow that it is territorially a part of the
United States .... 1165
Nevertheless, the flag of a vessel is a symbol of nationality and if
legitimately granted,' 66 it evidences to the world the nationality of
the vessel flying it. t 6 7 In certain regards, the flag evidences some-
thing closer to "pseudo-nationality" since the relationship between a
160 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept.7).
161 United States Lines Co. v. Eastburn Marine Chem. Co., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 881, 883
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (citing People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), Ltd., 302 U.S. 253
(1937)).
162 Id. (citing In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443 (1890)).
163 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1928).
164 221 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
165 Id. at 885.
166 A state may not grant nationality where it would impinge upon the rights of an-
other state. For example, 1) where the vessel already has, and desires to maintain, a dif-
ferent nationality; 2) where the granting state suspects the vessel will be used to violate
international law; and 3) when the vessel will possess the flag of more than one state.
Mertus, supra note 15, at 212 (citing BocZEK, supra note 80, at 105-06).
167 Id. Technically, under international law the flag of a vessel is considered primafacie
evidence of nationality. Id. Under United States and international law, only the registry
and documentation of a vessel unequivocally establish its nationality. Roos, supra note 86,
at 278. (citing The Merritt, 84 U.S. 582, 586 (1873); The Mohawk, 70 U.S. 566, 571
(1865)). The presence or absence of members of a particular nationality does not deter-
mine a vessel's nationality. Id. (citing L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, DECLARATIONS
ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MERCHANT VESSELS, art. 4 (1896)).
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ship and the nation granting it registry is unlike other relationships
relating to nationality.' 6 8 Despite this distinction and despite the
fact that a United States vessel may not be United States territory in
the literal sense, it is certainly subject to domestic law and federal
legislation.' 69 While there is an "assumption that Congress is pri-
marily concerned with domestic conditions,"' 170 it is a viable conten-
tion that Congress views United States flagged vessels as within the
domestic arena. 17' Indeed, almost immediately after the reflagging
of the Kuwaiti tankers, criticism was levelled at the United States,
asserting that the reflagging provided " 'temporary' cellophane flags
for extension of the use of force."' 172 The State Department's legal
advisor responded to this criticism by asserting that the vessels com-
plied with United States vessel documentation laws, were subject to
United States tax an corporate laws, were available to the govern-
ment for the Military Sealift Command, and were subject to United States
laws and jurisdiction.'73 Given this proclamation of the State Depart-
ment, the opinions of Judge Latchum of the district court and Judge
Cowen of the circuit court are unusual in that they are using a choice
of laws analysis effectively to exclude particular United States flagged
vessels from United States legislation.
2. Is There a Decline of Law of the Flag?
As the Supreme Court stated in Lauritzen, "[i]t is settled Ameri-
can doctrine that the law of the flag governs all matters of discipline
on a ship and all things done on board her which affect only the ship
and those belonging to her."' 174 As the Court further declared, "the
168 Mertus, supra note 15, at 212 (citing BOCZEK, supra note 80, at 121).
169 But see 46 U.S.C. § 12104(1) (1987)(dictating that a certificate of documentation
issued in accordance with United States laws is conclusive evidence of nationality for inter-
national purposes, but is not conclusive evidence of nationality in proceeding conducted
under the laws of the United States).
170 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
171 Black's Law Dictionary defines "state" as: "Any state of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession subject
to the legislative authority of the United States" BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1407 (6th ed. 1991)
(emphasis added) (citing UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, § 1-201(40)). This definition would
arguably include a United States flagged vessel as a territory or possession subject to
United States legislative authority.
Also instructive is the Court's language in Filardo where the Court noted that "[t]he
absence of any distinction between citizen and alien labor [in the Federal Eight Hour Law,
40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326] indicates to us that the statute was intended to apply only to those
places where the labor conditions of both citizen and alien employees are a probable con-
cern of Congress." Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. at 286. It seems sound to maintain that
seamen on American vessels are "a probable concern of Congress."
172 Wachenfeld, supra note 15, at 183 (quoting Paust, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1987, at E26, col. 3.).
173 Wachenfeld, supra note 15, at 183 (citing Sofaer, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1987, at E24, col. 5.) (emphasis in original).
174 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-86 (1953). See also McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) ("In addition, our attention is
called to the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordina-
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weight given to the ensign overbears most other connecting events
in determining applicable law."' 175 In this vein, one district court
noted "[tihe cases which apply the principle that the law of the flag is
to govern matters such as the one before us are legion."' 76 The dis-
trict court in Cruz and two panel members of the Third Circuit, how-
ever, gave only marginal consideration to the primacy of the
reflagged vessels' ensign as a basis for adjudicating the plaintiffs'
case. Judge Latchum of the District Court reasoned that a choice of
laws balance precluded the application of United States law, finding
the presence of the United States flag on the vessels insufficient to
overcome the factors weighing against assertion of American law. ' 77
In the circuit court, Judge Rosenn treated the Kuwaiti vessels as sub-
ject to United States jurisdiction, but discounted the notion of the
vessels as being American territory and ultimately found the plain-
tiffs outside of the FLSA coverage because of the uniquely political
nature of the reflagging.178 Judge Cowen nominally recognized the
presence of the United States flag, but failed to give it deference
under the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis triad sufficient to construe the
vessels as within American jurisdiction. OnlyJudge Alito gave defer-
ence to the flag of the tankers, noting that the United States had
sovereignty over United States flagged vessels.179
In many respects, the treatment of the district court and the ma-
jority of the Third Circuit represents a shift from the general doc-
trine of maritime law pronounced by the Supreme Court when it
noted that "[p]erhaps the most venerable and universal rule of mari-
time law ... is that which gives cardinal importance to the law of the
flag." 18 0 This doctrine has generally yielded the result that when
there has been a question over whether foreign law or domestic law
rily governs the internal affairs of a ship."); Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia., Nay. S.A.,
162 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("The general rule as to what law governs matters of the
'internal economy' of a ship, such as wages, is that the law of the flag controls").
175 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 585.
176 Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia., Nay. S.A., 162 F. Supp. 520, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(citing In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); The Hanna Nielsen, 273 F. 171 (2d Cir. 1921);
Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. 610 (1872); Transportes Maritimos Do Estado v. Almeido, 5 F.2d
151 (2d Cir. 1925); Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1950); Radovcic
v. The Princ Pavle, 45 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Rainey v. New York & P. S.S. Co., 216
F. 449 (9th Cir. 1914); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); The Belgenland,
114 U.S. 355 (1884); Grivas v. Alianza Compania Armadora, S.A., 150 F. Supp. 708
(S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
177 Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping Inc., 738 F. Supp. 809, 816-18 (D. Del. 1990). For a
listing of the eight factors weighed, see supra note 58. Only as an alternate holding did
Judge Latchum find the plaintiffs outside the commerce requirement of the FLSA. Cruz,
738 F. Supp. at 818-22.
178 The court found that the plaintiffs were seamen on an American vessel, thus meet-
ing the first prong of the two prong test. However, the court determined that the plaintiffs
were neither "in commerce" nor "employed be an enterprise engaged in commerce" as
required under the second prong of the test. Cruz, 932 F.2d at 224.
179 Id. at 235 n.L
180 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 584.
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prevailed, the law of the flag was given precedence.' 8 1 Cruz is dis-
tinct in that Judge Latchum of the district court and Judge Cowen of
the circuit court wanted to decline jurisdiction over a United States
vessel. It is perhaps more unusual when compared to a number of
cases in which United States courts have extended their reach to ex-
ert jurisdiction over foreign vessels,' 8 2 improperly registered ves-
sels'8 3 or stateless vessels.' 8 4 To advocate declining jurisdiction
over an American flagged vessel in this instance seems all the more
remarkable. Indeed, under the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis triad, the
general rule was that the United States would exert jurisdiction if the
seaman was a United States citizen or alien resident or if the vessel
was under the United States flag or owned by an American whose
base of operation was in the United States. Certainly Cowen's opin-
ion, which advocates declining jurisdiction despite the United States
flag, represents an example of the erosion of this previously recog-
nized rule.
3. Are Seamen No Longer "Wards of the Court"?
United States maritime law has been characterized as "very so-
licitous" of seamen who are within its jurisdictional reach.' 8 5 Under
United States law a seaman's employment and contractual relations
to a vessel is heavily regulated by federal legislation. Statutes gov-
erning this area are those which: delineate hours and conditions of
employment;' 8 6 make provisions for living conditions onboard a ves-
181 Paul S. Edelman, Suits By Alien Seamen, 3 MAR. LAw. 27, 32 (1978).
182 United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding that Con-
gress intended the Marijuana on the High Seas Act to apply to foreign seamen onboard
foreign vessels); United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd sub
nom., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S Ct. 753 (1991)
(holding vessel flying flag of United Kingdom subject to United States jurisdiction under
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306
(1970) (upholding application of Jones Act to Greek seaman injured aboard Greek vessel
while in United States territorial waters); Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 541
F.2d 307 (2d Cir.1976) (United States law applied to Greek flagged vessel on basis that
most of its voyages were to or from United States ports); Bobolakis v. Cia. Panamena
Maritima San Gerassimo, 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (holding that majority owner-
ship and control by Americans of Panamanian corporation owning Panamanian vessel suf-
ficient to give court jurisdiction in Greek seaman's claim under Jones Act); The
Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885) (pronouncing general rule which gave the United States
admiralty jurisdiction over foreign vessels involved in collisions).
183 United Sates v. Correa, 750 F.2d 1475 (11 th Cir. 1985) (finding jurisdiction over
vessel documented under United States laws as a United States vessel despite fact that
registration had been rendered invalid).
184 United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1985)(upholding United
States jurisdiction over a marijuana-carrying, stateless vessel on the high seas). Some cir-
cuits have held that a stateless vessel on the high seas is automatically subject to United
States jurisdiction regardless of whether the vessel has any contacts to the United States.
Curtis, supra note 93, at 230. Other circuits have declined to consider such vessels within
United States jurisdiction. Id.
185 Edelman, supra note 181, at 27.
186 46 U.S.C. § 8104 (1988).
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sel;18 7 exempt seamen from prepayment of court costs in pursuing a
claim in federal courts for wages;' 88 cover terms for payment of sea-
man's wages;'8 9 provide for double wages for certain seaman as pen-
alty for nonpayment;' 90 allow seaman to demand wages at specific
periods;' 9 ' and provide exemption of seaman's wages from attach-
ments except in specific circumstances.' 92 The abundance of legisla-
tion in this area illustrates the maritime principle that seamen are
"wards of admiralty" entitled to protection from ship owners. An
earlier case explains the reasoning behind this protectionistic
principle:
Seamen... are unprotected and need counsel.., they are thought-
less and require indulgence; . . . they are credulous and complying,
and are easily overreached.., they are considered as placed under
the dominion and influence of men who have naturally acquired a
mastery over them; and as they have little of the foresight and cau-
tion belonging to persons trained in other pursuits of life, the most
rigid scrutiny is instituted into the terms of every contract in which
they engage. 19
3
In line with this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit in Cruz v. Zapata
Ocean Resources, Inc. t94 noted that under international law a state may
not present a claim for a foreign nation, but that a possible exception
to this rule may apply if an alien seaman serves on a vessel of that
nation. 1 95 The court cited to the case of In re Ross,' 96 where, in refer-
ring to a British seaman serving aboard a United States vessel, the
Supreme Court observed:
The national character of the petitioner, for all the purposes of the
consular jurisdiction, was determinable by his enlistment as one of
the crew of the American Ship Bullion. By such enlistment he be-
comes an American seaman.., although his relations to the British
government are not so changed that, after expiration of his enlist-
ment on board of the American ship, that government may not en-
force his obligation of allegiance, and he on the other hand may not
be entitled to invoke its protection as a British subject, that relation
was changed during his service as a seaman on board of the Ameri-
can ship under his enlistment. He could then insist upon treatment
as an American seaman, and invoke for his protection all power of
the United States which could be called into exercise for the protec-
tion of seamen who were native born. 19 7
187 Id. §§ 11101-11104.
188 28 U.S.C. § 1916 (1988).
189 46 U.S.C. §§ 10313, 10504, 11105, 11106.
190 Id. § 10504.
191 Id. § 10313.
192 Id. § 11109.
193 Harden v. Gordon, F. Cas. 11, No. 6047 (C.C. Me. 1823).
194 695 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1982).
195 Id at 433. In Zapata, fifteen non-resident alien seamen sought recovery under the
Fisherman's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1977, for property lost when the Republic of Ec-
uador seized four American vessels off the Ecuadorian coast Id. at 430-31.
196 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
197 Zapata, 695 F.2d at 433-34. (quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 472 (1891)).
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The Ninth Circuit considered this definition of "American seaman,"
which included aliens serving as crew onboard a United States vessel,
to be supported by language adopted by the Department of State.198
Specifically, Foreign Service Regulations define "American seamen"
as: "(a) Seamen who are native born or fully naturalized citizens of
the United States" and "(b) [a]liens who have acquired and main-
tained the character of American seamen."' 99
While it is arguable that with increased sophistication and the
efforts of maritime labor unions, the modern seaman is not as prone
to overreaching as the seamen contemplated by the court in Harden
v. Gordon,200 it is still tenable to assert, as did the court in Ross,20
that seamen are entitled to special protection due to the nature of
their employment.202 In addition to being subject to the unique de-
mands of employment aboard a vessel at sea, the seamen aboard the
reflagged vessels were exposed to the dangers of mines and air at-
tack. 203 Indeed, the tanker Bridgeton struck a mine on its maiden voy-
age under the United States flag,20 4 resulting in fatalities among the
ship's officers. 20 5 The tanker Sea Isle City was hit by an Iranian silk-
worm missile, resulting in numerous injuries among the crew. 206 In
light of the protectionistic stance which Congress and the courts
have adopted towards the rights of seamen as a class, and given the
very specific dangers endured by the plaintiff seamen in Cruz, it is
inappropriate to refuse the seamen the ability to "invoke for [their]
protection all power of the United States which could be called into
exercise" and unconscionable to deny them the protection of mini-
198 Id. at 434.
199 Id. at n.10 (quoting Foreign Ser. Reg. U.S. XVI-2, nn.l, 23,June 1941 as cited in 4
G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 446, at 883-84)
200 F. Cas. 11, No. 6047.
201 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
202 In maritime legislation regarding seaman's wages and shipowner liability, Con-
gress has generally specified whether the statute is applicable to situations involving a
foreign element. Symeonides, supra note 100, at 225. In this fashion, the choice of laws
issue has been resolved a priori. Id. Where Congress has not specified the reach of mari-
time legislation, it has been suggested that directive established by legislation such as The
Seaman's Act of 1915, 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1976), providing that the Act was specifically ap-
plicable "to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States," should pro-
vide guidance in cases where Congress has failed to clearly define the transnational reach
of maritime legislation. Id. at 230.
203 Wachenfeld, supra note 15, at 174.
204 Id. at 174 n.6 (1988) (citing Convoy to a Minefield, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 3, 1987, at 20-
21).
205 REUTER LIBRARY REPORT, Tugs Battle to Douse Burning Kuwaiti Tanker, February 25,
1990. "The explosion ... set alight the highly-inflammable naphtha cargo and killed the
American captain and first mate." Id.
206 Wachenfeld, supra note 15, at 174 (citing United States Reprisals Against Iran, 23
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1206 (Oct. 20, 1987)). In response to the missile attack and the
resulting injury to eighteen seamen, the United States Navy shelled two Iranian offshore
oil platforms. Patrick D. Robbins, The War Powers Resolution Act After Fifteen Years: A Reassess-
ment, 38 Am. U. L. REV. 141, 143 (1988) (citing 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2597 (1987)).
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mum wage. 20 7
4. Is This a Unique Political Situation?
With reference to the opinions of Judge Latchum of the district
court and Judge Cowen of the circuit court, Cruz is unique in that it is
a reversal of the cases normally coming under application of the Lau-
ritzen-Rhoditis-Romero triad. In most litigation which has come under
the triad's choice of laws scrutiny, the vessel was registered under the
flag of another nation and the United States court was weighing its
interests in invading the sanctity of this symbol.208 Additionally,
Cruz is unique in that the reflagging was motivated by political rea-
sons as opposed to economic ones; the latter being factors normally
perennially involved with flags of convenience vessels.20 9 As the De-
partment of State noted, the reflagging was "an unusual measure to
meet an extraordinary situation."210 For this reason it is arguable
that the case does not lend itself well to analysis under the Lauritzen-
Romero-Rhoditis triad since that standard is more accurately suited to
determining issues related to commercial matters. 211 The temporary
nature of a political reflagging makes links between a vessel and its
registering state tenuous at best. In a commercial endeavor, the
links are more definite indicators of the relationship. Consequently,
only in an application to a commercial enterprise does a balancing
under the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis factors accurately reflect the true
nature of the business.
E. The Deficiencies of Choice of Laws Analysis
The application of the choice of laws in Cruz nevertheless serves
the valuable function of pointing up the limitations of the Lauritzen-
Romero-Rhoditis triad. Analysis under the choice of laws is sufficiently
nebulous to allow disparate results. In short, despite the fact that the
207 In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 472.
208 See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 571 (weighing United States interests in exercising juris-
diction over Danish flagged vessel); Romero, 358 U.S. at 354 (weighing United States inter-
ests in exerting jurisdiction over Spanish flagged vessel); Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 306
(weighing United States interests in exercising jurisdiction over Greek flagged vessel). See
also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1962) (considering whether provisions
of the National Labor Relations Board applied to foreign flagships).
209 Mertus, supra note 15, at 211. Though unusual, the practice of reflagging for polit-
ical reasons does have historical precedent. Id. at 211 n.33. American vessels avoided
British ships blockading the American coast during the War of 1812 by sailing under the
flag of Portugal. Id. (citing Flags of Convenience - The "Offshore" Registration of Ships, in E.
GOLD, NEW DIRECTIONS IN MARITIME LAW 85 (1978). Similarly, English vessels registered
under the ensign of German principalities to avoid French vessels blockading the conti-
nent during the Napoleonic wars. Id. (citing BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 8 (1962)).
210 Wachenfeld, supra note 15, at 177. (quoting UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, CUR-
RENT POLICY No. 958, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 2 (1987)).
211 In a majority of admiralty cases the named defendant is a corporation, partnership,
or company. K. D. Kerameus, Admiralty Jurisdiction in Continental Countries, 8 MAR. LAw. 329,
331 (1983).
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eight factors enumerated by the triad are clearly defined, the flexibil-
ity of the standard lends itself too easily to distortion. For example,
if Judge Cowen had given the deference to the flag of the vessel as
the Supreme Court did in Lauritzen,2 12 it is likely that he would have
favored of applying American law. Likewise, had he elected to place
greater weight upon the broader American interests involved in the
reflagging, such as maintaining a free flow of oil to the Western
world, security in the Persian Gulf, and preventing the Soviets from
gaining a foothold in the region, the outcome may have been very
different. In a footnote, Judge Cowen noted that if the seamen had
greater contacts with the United States, they would have most likely
been covered by the FLSA.213 By making this remark, Judge Cowen
intimated that the issue was a close one, with only a slight weight
shifting the balance. This provokes the observation that the factors
which tip the scale under a Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis analysis may
change to such an extent that they rise to the level of becoming
overly subjective.
1. Is There a "New" Political Factor in Choice of Laws
Analysis?
It has been proffered that the Lauritzen case did not supply a
"definitive test" for evaluating choice of laws given the fact that it left
"unresolved all the possible combinations of 'contacts' which were
not exactly the Lauritzen contacts combinations .... ,,214 Moreover,
as the Supreme Court noted in Rhoditis, the list of Lauritzen factors
was not exhaustive.2 15 Indeed, the circuit courts have shown divi-
sion over the exact weight to be accorded to each of the factors and
over what additional factors could be considered. 216
Following the view that the triad's factors are not exhaustive,
212 As the Court in Lauritzen noted: "Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of
maritime law ... is that which gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag" and "[it is
significant to us here that the weight given to the ensign overbears most other connecting
events in determining applicable law." Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 584.
213 Id. at 234 n.3.
214 Tate, supra note 98, at 204 (quoting G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMI-
RALTY § 6-63, at 472 (2d ed. 1975))
215 Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 308-09.
216 Tate, supra note 98, at 206-07 (Comparing Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V., 628 F.2d 308,
317 (5th Cir. 1980) (United States law applied; entire service and revenues at time of acci-
dent arose from base of operations in United States); Antypas v. Cia Maritima San Basilio.
S.A., 541 F.2d 307, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977) (United States
law applied; most voyages to or from the United States ports); and Moncada v. Lemuria
Shipping Corp., 491 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. noa., Ekberg Shipping Corp. v.
Moncada, 417 U.S. 947 (1974) (United States law applied; 40% of its voyages either to or
from United States ports), with DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899-902 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978) (United States law did not apply: although there was
United States ownership of vessels that regularly called at United States ports, no income
was earned in United States from particular vessel, and "base of operations" not in United
States)).
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Judge Cowen introduced a new "political factor" into the triad and
in this application, made it virtually the supreme consideration. This
new political factor may merely fit in as an additional element gener-
ally considered to be part of the unarticulated triad factors. Or, as
Rhoditis authorizes, it may be merely a "governmental interests analy-
sis."121 7 Regardless, during the process of the reflagging, there was
certain emphasis on disclaiming the more political aspects of the
reflagging, with the U.S. government asserting that the United States
was only attempting to keep neutral shipping safe.218
2. Were American Interests Sufficient?
Judge Cowen suggested that the outcome of his evaluation
under choice of laws principles may have been different had the
sailors resided in the United States or had their contacts with the
United States been more substantial. 219 From this, he intimated, if
not explicitly stated, that the issue was a close one which could have
favored the plaintiffs with a few more factors on the side of United
States jurisdiction. This raises the question as to why Judge Cowen
did not accord greater weight to the broader United States goals
served under the reflagging.
The intervention achieved by reflagging the Kuwaiti tankers
clearly served United States economic and political interests as it al-
lowed the maintenance of an uninterrupted supply of oil to the West
and prevented the Soviet Union from establishing a presence in the
Gulf region. The Iranian attacks on merchant shipping during the
Iran-Iraq war threatened to de-stabilize the entire Persian Gulf220
and with it, to disrupt elements of the American economy and the
broader American political agenda pertaining to the Middle East.
Following World War II, the United States has been dependant upon
the Middle East for a significant supply of its oil and has had substan-
tial political interests in maintaining overall stability in the area. 221
As the Persian Gulf region can weigh heavily in maintaiiing the bal-
ance between the West and the Soviet Union, it is important to the
United States that Gulf countries do not fall under the influence of
217 Tate, supra note 98, at 206 (citing Fisher v. Agios Nicolas V, 628 F.2d 308, 316 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Valmas Bros. Shipping, S.A. v. Fisher, 454 U.S. 816 (1981)).
218 See, e.g., SenatorJoseph Biden,Jr. &John B. Ritch, Commentary, The War Power at a
Constitutional Impasse: A 'Joint Decision" Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367, 368 (1988).
219 Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 234 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991). Judge
Cowen failed to acknowledge, however, that the United States government specifically
granted certain waivers contingent upon the agreement of the Kuwaitis that these vessels
would not enter American ports in order to prevent economic skewing due to the fact that
they had not had to comply with all the safety and drydocking requirements.
220 Charles A. Kupchan, NA TO and the Persian Gulf Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior, 42
INT'L ORG. 317, 339 (1988).
221 THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, OIL AND TURMOIL: WESTERN
CHOICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 12 (1979).
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the Soviet Union. 222 Given the fact that increased United States
presence in the area was based on a link to the reflagged vessels, it is
reasonable to assert that the United States would have been justified
in maintaining absolute control over all matters affecting the reflag-
ged tankers. The district court in Cruz rather blandly stated that the
only American interest linked to the reflagging was the goal "to safe-
guard the United States security and foreign policy objectives in the
Persian Gulf."' 223 It became disconcertingly clear that the court re-
garded such an interest as nominal when the court dismissed its sig-
nificance under the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis triad. This is perhaps
more remarkable when it is considered that countries have author-
ized military actions based on such types of justification.
Indeed, the reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers caused a significant
clash between President Reagan and Congress over the power to
send troops abroad into a hostile situation.22 4 Congress argued that
the buildup of United States troops in the region necessitated invo-
cation of the War Powers Resolution 22 5 in order to authorize the
commitment. 226 There was legitimate and substantial concern that
the reflagging and the contingent military buildup needed to protect
the reflagged tankers represented "a mission entailing a considera-
ble possibility that the United States would be drawn into one of the
century's bloodiest wars." 22 7 The reflagging also generated criticism
that while the purpose in reflagging the tankers was portrayed as one
designed to protect "the right to innocent passage on the high seas
... [iln fact, Administration policy represented nothing less than a
major of commitment of American forces on the Iraqi side in the
Iran-Iraq War."'228 Regardless of such possible interpretations,
222 Id. This contention is confirmed by the fact that the U.S. convinced the Kuwaitis
approached the Soviet Union first to allow reflagging of the Kuwaiti vessels, the U.S. was
anxious to avoid such a situation. Cruz, 738 F. Supp. at 811. In "very high level" discus-
sions, the U.S. stressed that allowing the Soviets to conduct the reflagging would be:
against their interests and the interests of other countries in the area as well
as the Western interests to give the Soviet Union a major role in protecting
oil destined for the West and to allow the Soviet Union to make a strategic
foothold in this particular part of the world.
Id. (citing Kuwaiti Tanker Hearings, supra note 11, at 39).
223 738 F. Supp. at 817.
224 Robbins, supra note 206, at 142.
225 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(1982)).
226 Paul Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review At the End of the
Reagan Era, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 427 (1989). The War Powers Resolution requires that
the President confer with Congress before sending United States troops in hostile situa-
tions abroad. Robbins, supra note 206, at 142.
227 Biden & Ritch, supra note 218, at 369.
228 Id. at 368. The authors opined:
In assessing the Administration's decision, it bears emphasis that the
Gulf nation crucially dependent on exporting oil by sea is Iran. Iraq and its
key Arab allies have enormous pipeline capabilities which enable them to
circumvent the Gulf. It was precisely for this reason that Iraq extended its
land warfare against Iran into a sea war against Iranian shipping. Had Iraq at
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American servicemen fought, were injured, and died in the course of
protecting the reflagged vessels. Thirty seven United States Navy
sailors were killed aboard the American missile frigate U.S.S. Stark
when it was hit by two missiles and ten Navy sailors were injured
when the American missile frigate U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts struck an
Iranian mine.2 29
Indeed, the military buildup contingent to the reflagging repre-
sented significant United States military action. Though the United
States has maintained a presence in the Gulf since the years follow-
ing World War II, the commitment of United States troops related to
the reflagging represented the largest buildup of American troops
since the Vietnam War.2 3 0 The reflagging by some measures was the
biggest and costliest mission of the United States Navy since World
War 11.231 Between July and September of 1987 alone, the buildup
and operating costs contingent to the reflagging totalled approxi-
mately $69 million by some estimations. s23 The number of United
States vessels in the Persian Gulf quadrupled, 233 resulting in the
presence of more than thirty United States warships in the region at
one point,2 3 4  and the involvement of approximately 15,000
troops.23 5 It is very clear that American interests were quite sub-
stantial and certainly were more than just a factor to be considered
nominally under the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis triad.
any point been willing to desists in the sea war, Iran surely would have done
likewise.
Thus when the United States committed major naval forces in the Gulf,
the principal effect was not to assert the right of passage on the seas -nor to
protect the 'vital oil lifeline to the West' from an Iranian threat - but rather to
deploy american power on the Iraqi side of that war. Iraq could now inten-
sify its sea attacks on Iranian shipping with the extra incentive that Iranian
retaliation might draw United States forces into active conflict with Iran, the
United States Navy had thereby become an adjunct of Iraqi policy.
Id. at 368 n.3. See also C. Wilbanks, STATES NEWS SERVICE, August 28, 1990 (Rhode Island
SenatorJohn Chafee quoted as saying "By flying our flags on Kuwaiti vessels, like it or not
we will have effectively chosen sides in the war ... Our lot will have been cast with Iraq); D.
Hoffman, Delicate Gulf Balance Undone in a Lightning Strike, WASH. POST, August 3, 1990, at
A25. ("[T]he U.S. was implicitly helping Iraq in order to prevent Iran from winning a
chokehold on the world's oil.").
229 R. Pyle, Changes in Operating Procedures Could Be In Store; Navy Applying the Lessons of
"Do-It-Yourself War" in Gulf, L. A. TIMES, October 30, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
230 Robbins, supra note 206, at 142. (citing WASH. POsT, Jan. 11, 1988, at Al, col. 2).
231 See Pyle, supra note 229.
232 Wachenfeld, supra note 15, at 176 n.13. (citing R. O'RoURKE, PERSIAN GULF: U.S.
MILITARY OPERATIONS 4-7 (Congressional Research Serv. No. IB87145, 1987)).
233 See Pyle, supra note 229.
234 p. Werr, U.S. Commander Says America Would Help Kuwait If Attacked, REUTER LIBRARY
REPORT, Oct. 11, 1989.
235 Robbins, supra note 206, at 167 (citing Sen. Alan Cranston, Revise the War Powers
Act, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1987, at A23, col. 1).
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3. Would a Ruling for the Plaintiffs Give Rise to Significant
International Effects?
While members of the circuit court were disinclined to impose
any form of a mandate upon the foreign governments involved in
Cruz, the case does not represent a circumstance in which the asser-
tion of American jurisdiction and a ruling for the plaintiffs would
have given rise to any untoward international effects. Given Judge
Rosenn's description of the protectionistic nature of the Philippines
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),236 which negotiated
the Filipino seamens' labor contract, it appears illogical to assert that
any application of United States minimum wage standards would dis-
turb the sovereignty of the Filipino Government, since any such ac-
tion by the United States would only benefit the concerned
Philippine nationals. It is clear, however, that many developing na-
tions depend upon flag of convenience registry as a significant
source of revenue and would rebuff any external interference with
their ability to set seamen's wages, as the low level of these wages
attract shippers. 23 7 Indeed, relevant to Cruz, providing crews for for-
eign flag vessels produces the sixth largest source of income for the
Philippines, and as wage parity would threaten to limit the appeal of
Philippine nationals as low cost crew members, the Philippine Gov-
ernment might be averse to any such development. 238
Despite this, the court's hesitance to embrace foreign seamen
engaged in work upon an American vessel as an impingement upon
the sovereignty of another nation is ill-founded. First, it is curious
that Judge Latchum of the district court and Judges Cowen and Alito
of the circuit court should look to the language of the FLSA for a
declaration relating to conflict of law, since the statute was to be ap-
plied to seamen on American vessels. Such application is certainly
not extraterritorial in the sense that the territory concerned belongs
wholly to another government. Second, the application of American
labor law to foreign nationals employed onboard United States ships
would not likely represent the commencement of a trend. The in-
stant matter involved unique circumstances. Furthermore, Congress
adjusted the manning requirements for United States vessels and
eliminated the foreign-to-foreign exemption thus obviating the po-
236 Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 1991). The court
describes the POEA as, in part, an organization designed "to afford protection to Philip-
pine workers and their families" and one which "approves their wages" and "provides
worker assistance and welfare services." Id.
. 237 H. D. BESS & MARTIN T. FARRIS, U.S. MARITIME POLICY: HISTORY AND PROSPECTS
161 (1979).
238 Id. (citing T. Lones, ITF Can Win Some Battles, But Will It Lose the War?, SEATRADE,
April 1979, 59-60; K. Grundey, Flags of Convenience in 1978, Transport Studies Group, Dis-
cussion Paper no. 8 (1978)). Given the domestic economy of many countries providing
crews for foreign ships, wage parity would in some cases cause a seaman to earn more
income than cabinet members, doctors, and many other professionals. Id.
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tential for any such future occurence.23 9
Further, the United States is not a country considered by ship-
owners to be a favorable flag of convenience registry nation and in
fact, the majority of United States owned vessels are flagged under
the ensign of another country.2 40 The measures the United States
chooses to employ with regard to vessels under its flag is of little
concern to the maritime world and flags of convenience vessels in
particular. Indeed, the whole application of the term flag of conven-
ience to the vessels concerned in the present dispute is arguably
incorrect.
Historically, flags of convenience have been both granted by a
country and secured by a shipper largely for economic reasons. 24'
Shipowners have traditionally secured foreign registry to avoid com-
pliance with more stringent or more costly requirements mandated
under domestic laws.242 The countries granting the flags are typi-
cally economically developing countries which rely upon the revenue
generated by granting such flags as a substantial source of income
for their national economy. 243 Both parties reap the economic re-
wards of the relationship, as the fees levied for registration generates
funds for the flagging country and the minimal regulation allows a
shipper to operate a vessel or fleet of vessels at substantially reduced
costs. Given the exclusively political nature of the reflagging of the
Kuwaiti tankers, it is, therefore, somewhat of a misnomer to apply
the term "flag of convenience" with its economic connotations to the
case under scrutiny. 244
239 Supra note 20.
240 BESS & FARRIS, supra note 237, at 150-51. In 1976, of the 985 vessels that were
U.S. owned, only 290 were registered under the U.S. flag. Id. According to the 1980
United Nations Conference of Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), one-third of all
tonnage sailing under the ensign of a "flag-of-convenience" country is controlled by
United States interests. Mertus, supra note 148, at 216. Crew wages represent a substan-
tial portion of the high operating costs for American flagged vessels. Wells, supra note 80,
at 224.
241 Osieke, supra note 51, at 604.
242 While the practice became commonplace following World War One, Id., the tradi-
tion of flags of convenience has been traced to at least the Sixteenth Century when English
merchants used Spanish registry in order to engage in the West Indies trade which was
dominated by the Spaniards. BEss & FARRIS, supra note 237, at 150.
243 Osieke, supra note 51, at 604.
244 A widely accepted definition for "flag of convenience" contains the following
elements:
1. The country of registry allows ownership and/or control of its merchant
vessels by non-citizens.
2. Access to registry is easy. A ship may usually be registered at a consul's
office abroad. Equally important, transfer from the register at the owner's
option is not restricted.
3. Taxes on the income from ships are not levied locally or are low. A reg-
istry fee and an annual fee, based on tonnage, are normally the only charges
made. A guarantee or acceptable understanding regarding future freedom
from taxation may also be given.
4. The country of registry is a small power with no national requirement
under any foreseeable circumstances for all shipping is registered, but re-
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VI. Conclusion
Broadly the court in Cruz was hesitant to impose any form of
mandate involving foreign governments, fearing an adverse impact.
The court failed to note, however, that Kuwait, the only country
which would have felt any impact from an adverse decision, was the
country primarily seeking to benefit from the status and protection
of the United States.2 45 The United States government was willing
to extract a quid pro quo from Kuwaiti by requiring it to adhere to
United States laws regarding ownership, safety, and manning re-
quirements as part of the reflagging. In that instance it did not hesi-
tate to impose a set of federally mandated rules upon a foreign
nation. Thus, there is no reason why the United States should see to
the safety of the Filipino seamen, but not to their welfare by drawing
an artificial distinction at the issue of wages. The contract the
Kuwaiti government entered into with the Philippine government re-
garding employment of the Filipino seamen should have been sub-
sidiary to the fact that the vessels were flagged with the United States
flag and that the Kuwaiti government thus voluntarily subjected the
vessels to United States law.
It is inconsistent to assert the existence of a paper trail and lack
of direct and specific activity in commerce as a grounds for disclaim-
ing jurisdiction or rejecting accountability for matters concerning
the vessels. It was this very trail and the United States ensign on the
reflagged vessels upon which the United States asserted its right to
defend the tankers in the eyes of the world. Had it proven necessary,
the United States would have utilized these same elements as justifi-
cation for the right to defend the tankers in any international or do-
mestic tribunal. Such a disclaimer, if done at the time the vessels
were operating with United States Navy escort, would have made the
ceipts from very small charges on large tonnage may produce a substantial
effect on its national income and balance of payments.
5. Manning of ships by non-nationals is freely permitted.
6. The country of registry has neither the power nor the administrative ma-
chinery effectively to impose any government or international regulations,
nor has the wish or the power to control the companies themselves.
BESS & FARRIS, supra note 237, at 152-53 (citing K. Grundey, Flags of Convenience Transport
Studies Group, Discussion Paper no. 8 (1978)).
A more contemporary definition states simply:
Flags of convenience are the national flags of those states with whom ship-
owners register their vessels in order to avoid (a) the fiscal obligations, and
(b) the conditions and terms of employment of factors of production that
would have been applicable if the vessels were registered in their own
countries.
Id. (citing RIGAS DOGANIS & BASIL N. METAXAS, THE IMPACT OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
(1976)).
245 Any "impact" felt by Kuwait would be negligible. Additionally, when it is consid-
ered that Kuwait is one of the richest nation's in the world per capita and the Philippines
one of the poorer, it seems disturbing to push the scales in favor of Kuwait in the mis-
placed fear that some untoward effect arise.
1992] 379
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
United States susceptible to a challenge by a foreign state that it was
not evidencing a "genuine link" with the flagged vessel, as required
under the Law of the Seas.2 46 Indeed, one author suggests that the
United States specifically took advantage of "the vagueness of the
genuine link requirement, using the reflagged vessels to achieve
broader political objectives in the Persian Gulf."2 4 7
If the court had ruled in favor of the plaintiff seamen, this action
would not only comport with federal law, but with international law
as well. The vessels were flagged under the United States ensign,
thereby imbuing' the United States government not only with the
right to oversee labor issues, but by some views of international law,
the responsibility to administer them.2 48 The International Court of
Justice stated that "[w]hen a State admits into its territory foreign
investments or foreign nationals, whether natural orjuristic persons,
it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes
obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them. '2 49 In
addition to this standard, there is substantial federal legislation gov-
erning the employment of seamen, much of which serves a protec-
tionist function.250 The abundance of legislation in this area is
partially sprung from the notion that seamen are particularly prone
to overreaching by a shipowner. Given the generally recognized
symbolism of the flag a vessel flies, it seems that the court would be
conservative when determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over
a vessel flying the flag of another country, but liberal when consider-
ing a United States flag vessel.
Aside from the fact that the court in Cruz arrived at a holding
which may be questionable, it is significant that the court debated
246 The Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law notes that the lack of a genuine
link between the vessel and the registering state does not allow another state to refuse to
recognize the flag or to interfere with the ship, but does allow the protesting state to reject
diplomatic protection by the flag state. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 501 cmt. b (1986).
247 Wachenfeld, supra note 15, at 175. Despite this criticism, the reflagging was sup-
ported by decisions of the International Court of Justice and the United States Supreme
Court. Haimbaugh, supra note 15, at 151.
248 THE RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 notes: "Subject to
§ 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:
(1)(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have sub-
stantial effect within its territory...;
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals
which is directed against the security of the state or a limited class of other
state interests.
249 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (June 22).
250 Among the statutes governing this area are: 46 U.S.C. § 8104 (delineates hours
and conditions of employment); 46 U.S.C. § 11101-11103 (contains provisions for living
conditions onboard vessel); 28 U.S.C § 1916 (exempt seamen from prepayment of court
costs in pursuing a claim in federal courts for wages); 46 U.S.C. §§ 10313, 10504, 11105,
11106 (cover payment of seaman's wages); 46 U.S.C. § 10504 (provides for double wages
for certain seaman as penalty for nonpayment); 46 U.S.C.§ 11109 (provides exemption of
seaman's wages from attachments except in specific circumstances).
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not only the holding itself, but the legal avenue through which that
holding should be determined. While such a task may not be one
with which federal courts are entirely unfamiliar, given the signifi-
cance and potential impact of adjudication which can extend to the
international arena, it seems elemental that the judicial approaches
in this area should be carefully delineated and defined. The court's
debate raises a question of the proper standard, if a single appropri-
ate standard exists, and it additionally serves to highlight the poten-
tial shortcomings of either method of interpretation when the issue
has such close ties to political concerns.
It is arguable that Judges Rosenn and Cowen, while advocating
the distinct applicability of a specific juristic method, indeed failed to
apply these methods as strictly as their rationale would dictate. After
advocating analysis under strict statutory interpretation methods,
Judge Rosenn rejected an otherwise accurate argument on the basis
that the situation at hand was unique and hence precluded coverage
of the plaintiffs within the statutory language of the FLSA. In this
sense, Judge Rosenn abandoned strict statutory interpretation when
he failed to serve his argument and instead relied on a form of rebut-
tal that is reminiscent of a choice of laws factor balancing test. Judge
Cowen, on the other hand, inappropriately employed a choice of
laws standard, but by placing so little weight on the law of the flag,
he applied it in a manner that was almost contrary to the cases which
spawned the standard in the first place.
Judge Cowen's argument further serves as a manifest demon-
stration of the fact that the flexibility of the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis
triad appears to delineate somewhat objective standards to deter-
mine choice of laws, but is used in a largely subjective manner. In
effect this might lead an adjudicative body to evaluate an issue not so
much by objectively according weight appropriately to the various
factors, but by according weight in a manner so as to support some
general, over-arching idea of how the issue should be resolved. In
short, the court may use the factors not to decide the dispute, but
rather to support a decision made independently of any balancing of
these factors. Indeed, both concurring opinions of the circuit court
allow the political nature of the reflagging to dominate their reason-
ing and to dictate the outcome. Judge Rosenn overruled the com-
merce element because of the uniquely political nature of the
reflagging and Judge Cowen seemed hesitant to construe the matter
as within United States jurisdiction because of the political nature of
the reflagging. Such treatment runs counter to the judicial trend in
maritime cases which has reflected a "rational non-result-oriented
decisions" 251 approach since the emphasis seems to be placed on
declining coverage of the plaintiffs through varying means.
251 Watson, supra note 87, at 116.
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Given the division evident in the opinions of the circuit court
judges, it appears that a congressional declaration or a more explicit
Supreme Court guideline is called for in this case and any others like
it which may arise in the future. Absent a specific congressional dec-
laration in future maritime legislation, it would be beneficial for Con-
gress to define the exact territorial relationship a vessel has to its
registering country with regard to domestic legislation. It is the
opinion of this author that Congress has always considered United
States flagged vessels within its legislative reach. However, in light
of the Cruz desision, Congress needs to set forth specific guidelines
regarding the United States' relationship with U.S. flagged vessels so
that the courts can adjudicate matters with consistency and in a man-
ner that balances American domestic interests against international
concerns.
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